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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over 150 years ago, the Supreme Court expanded the potential scope of 
patents by adopting a doctrine to prevent “substantial copies” of an 
invention by providing coverage over inventions that are “equivalent” to that 
patented. 1  The doctrine of equivalents had been consistently applied by 
courts until its rapid “demise” between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s.  
In recent years, distinguished academics have studied the so-called 
“demise” of the doctrine of equivalents. Professors John Allison, Mark 
Lemley, and Lee Petherbridge have each empirically analyzed this doctrine. 
All of their studies conclude that successful use of the doctrine has 
substantially diminished over time.2 With very little detail or support, Allison 
and Lemley speculated that trial court judges caused the death of the doctrine 
of equivalents after they were tasked with construing the scope of patent 
1. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853).
2. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958 (2007); Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371, 1378–79 (2010) [hereinafter Petherbridge, Doctrine of 
Equivalents]; Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 215, 233 (2008) [hereinafter Petherbridge, Claim Construction Effect]. 
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claims in Markman v. Westview Instruments.3 They contended that if trial judges 
learned the technology and ruled against the patentee on claim construction,4 
they desired to resolve the entire dispute, which required adjudicating the 
equivalents claim against the patentee as well. 5  Petherbridge offered a 
different theory. He provided evidence that the decline occurred years after 
Markman, only after a significant Supreme Court decision on the doctrine of 
equivalents, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,6 which reduced 
the applicability of the doctrine.7 While each of these researchers noted that 
the doctrine of equivalents had decreased in its successful use and provided 
some grounds for the decrease, none clearly explained why. As such, the 
cause and precise mechanism behind the so-called “demise” of the doctrine 
of equivalents have largely been mysterious.  
This Article sheds light on the mystery by providing a novel theoretical 
model and extensive empirical evidence to explain the decline of the 
doctrine. In large part, the demise occurred as a result of two complementary 
forces discussed for the first time in this Article: “doctrinal reallocation” and 
“doctrinal displacement.”8 
Appellate courts have the power to engage in “doctrinal reallocation” by 
altering adjudicatory control of a doctrine. Control can be regulated in 
numerous ways. For example, the decision-maker tasked with adjudicating 
the doctrine in question can be shifted at the trial-court level from the jury to 
the judge, or vice-versa. Or, the appellate court may increase its control by 
reviewing lower court decisions de novo instead of under a clearly erroneous 
standard. These are forms of “doctrinal reallocation.” Once control of a 
doctrine increases, a higher court may alter the prominence of the doctrine in 
the adjudicatory process. When a judge instead of a jury makes a decision, 
cases are more easily resolved by summary judgment and readily reviewed on 
appeal. Lowering the deference in appellate review permits the higher court 
to more easily correct decisions with which it disagrees.  
 
 3. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958; see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 
52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (overruling precedent permitting juries to 
construe patent claims), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 4. Claim construction refers to the process of determining the literal scope of a 
patentee’s rights. 
 5. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958. 
 6. 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 7. Petherbridge, Doctrine of Equivalents, supra note 2, at 1391–92. 
 8. For a broader discussion of these new theories, see David L. Schwartz & Ted M. 
Sichelman, Doctrinal Displacement (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1832705. 
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Reallocating a doctrine to a judge does more than simply empower a 
court to profoundly influence the importance of that doctrine—there are 
further-reaching consequences. A change in the importance of a given 
doctrine may lead to the decline of other, typically related, doctrines in the 
same field of law. These “displaced” doctrines may have been extremely 
important prior to being dislodged.  
The theories of doctrinal reallocation and displacement explain the chain 
reaction resulting in the demise of the doctrine of equivalents. Initially, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reshaped patent litigation in 
Markman. There, it overruled previous precedent and held that claim 
construction was an issue of law that should be exclusively examined by a 
judge rather than a jury.9 Shortly thereafter, the Federal Circuit in Cybor Corp. 
v. FAS Technologies ruled that claim construction should be reviewed by the 
appellate court using the expansive de novo standard. 10  These decisions 
triggered significant changes in patent litigation, not only in connection with 
claim construction, but also with respect to the doctrine of equivalents. 
Claim construction, which was significant but not critical before these 
decisions, rapidly became the centerpiece of patent litigation. Nearly 
contemporaneously, the doctrine of equivalents declined in importance. In 
effect, these doctrines switched places in terms of significance as a judicial 
tool. This switch occurred, in part, because both doctrines are essentially 
substitute ways for the court to evaluate the proper reach of an invention. 
When one means of evaluating scope—claim construction—became 
relatively easier for the court to apply, courts began to rely upon it more. As 
a result of this shift, patent litigation today is far different than litigation in 
the early 1990s.  
The purpose of this Article is two-fold. Testing the theories of doctrinal 
reallocation and doctrinal displacement, the Article first presents evidence 
that doctrinal reallocation occurred in patent litigation in the wake of 
Markman. In the aftermath of that reallocation, the Federal Circuit increased 
the importance of claim construction in patent litigation. This observation, 
based in part on empirical data, highlights the ability of the court to shape 
patent law after reallocating the responsibility for claim construction to the 
judge.  
 
 9.  Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 978; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 
F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (overruling precedent permitting juries to construe 
patent claims), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 10. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
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Second, the Article examines the demise of the doctrine of equivalents in 
the lens of doctrinal displacement. 11  Specifically, this Article provides 
empirical evidence showing that the rise in the importance of claim 
construction foreshadowed a sharp decline in the importance of the doctrine 
of equivalents. Reducing the significance of the doctrine of equivalents was 
in line with the Federal Circuit’s goal of curbing the unpredictability of patent 
jury trials. 
This Article has four additional Parts. Part II explains the theory of 
doctrinal reallocation and displacement in the context of adjustments to 
claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents by the Federal Circuit. 
Part III describes the empirical study design and methodology. Part IV 
propounds hypotheses about the expected effect of Markman and Cybor on 
patent litigation and the expected demise of the doctrine of equivalents. It 
also delivers empirical results relating to the displacement of the doctrine of 
equivalents in patent law. Part V concludes with some brief remarks about 
the significance of the findings. 
II. THEORY  
Doctrinal reallocation12 and doctrinal displacement13 may occur in almost 
any area of law. Scholars have recognized that a shift in decision-making 
authority from jury to judge (and vice-versa) can alter substantive doctrine,14 
but they have yet to provide a formal theory to explain this jurisprudential 
phenomenon. This Article provides such a theory and tests it with data in the 
 
 11. Although the doctrine of equivalents and claim construction both affect the 
ultimate reach of a given patent claim, they are separate doctrines. See Tate Access Floors, 
Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The doctrine 
of equivalents expands the reach of claims beyond their literal language.”). However, others 
have noted that the doctrine of equivalents and claim construction overlap. See, e.g., Kevin 
Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On Thing 
Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493 (2008) (arguing that courts at 
times allow literal claim scope to grow to encompass after arising technologies, a task 
traditionally performed by the doctrine of equivalents).  
 12. Doctrinal reallocation refers to reallocating the responsible decision-maker for a 
doctrine. It is a loose analogy to asset reallocation. In asset reallocation, a portfolio is 
adjusted among different asset classes to reduce risk. 
 13. Doctrinal displacement refers to displacing one doctrine with another. See infra 
Section II.B. 
 14. For a review of the history of legal realists and their views on procedure, see NEIL 
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 55–169 (1995); see also Frank B. 
Cross, Legal Process, Legal Realism and the Strategic Political Effects of Procedural Rules 2 (Univ. of 
Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 065, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=837665 (“Realists argue that the apparently neutral procedural requirements are 
created or applied precisely for their ideological implications.”). 
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context of the Federal Circuit, which reviews nearly all appeals involving 
issues of patent law.15 This Part briefly explains the theories of doctrinal 
reallocation and doctrinal displacement using two doctrines from patent law: 
claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents. 
A. DOCTRINAL REALLOCATION AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
There are many reasons why a court may wish to increase the importance 
of a doctrine. Typically the change is made because the court wants to 
implement an institutional preference. These institutional preferences often 
are designed to reduce the uncertainty of litigation outcomes—in other 
words, courts aim to improve the predictability and stability of the 
adjudicatory process. Separately, courts are worried about institutional 
legitimacy and fairness. Alternatively, courts may have concerns about 
excessive caseloads, and they raise the significance of a doctrine to permit 
swifter resolution of lawsuits.  
Before discussing the theory in detail, several terms must be defined. 
First, this Article uses “importance” of a doctrine to mean how central a 
doctrine is to an area of law, including, for example, how often it is raised 
and how often it is dispositive of the entire dispute.16  Second, “control” 
refers to the ability of judges to determine the importance of a doctrine not 
just for a given case, but for an area of law as a whole. The importance of the 
doctrine may change with or without changing the substance of the 
underlying law. 
Any court can alter the importance of a doctrine by various procedural 
mechanisms. Through these procedural mechanisms, examples of which are 
described infra, district and appellate judges can change the quantum of their 
control over the doctrine. One final note about jurisprudential control is 
appropriate. Increased control over a doctrine does not always lead to the 
doctrine becoming more important. Rather, control provides courts with the 
ability to make the doctrine more or less important. The direction of 
importance, either increased or decreased, is typically dictated by the court’s 
overall institutional goal. If the goal is to lighten judicial workload, for 
example, the court may increase the importance of a statute of limitations. 
Alternatively, if the goal is to heighten predictability, the court may decrease 
the importance of an unstructured jury doctrine. 
 
 15. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 
535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002).  
 16. This Article analyzes various aspects of judicial decisions to evaluate importance, 
necessarily making the assumption that these decisions are a good measure of the centrality 
of an issue to the universe of disputes including unlitigated disputes. 
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Judges can increase or decrease their control over a doctrine in several 
fashions. One method is to “reallocate” the decision-making authority over a 
particular doctrine among various institutional actors. “Horizontal” 
reallocation refers to shifts of authority within the trial court—for example, 
between the judge and jury. “Vertical” reallocation refers to shifts of 
authority between upper and lower courts—for instance, by changing the 
standard of review on appeal. Horizontal reallocation and vertical 
reallocation are depicted in the two-by-two matrix shown in Figure 1, infra.17  
Figure 1: Horizontal and Vertical Reallocation 
 V
er
tic
al
 R
ea
llo
ca
tio
n 
 
 Decision-maker: Jury  
Std of Review: de novo 
Decision-maker: Judge 
Std of Review: de novo 
Decision-maker: Jury 
Std of Review: deferential 
Decision-maker: Judge 
Std of Review: deferential 
     Horizontal Reallocation     
Within the trial court, decision-making responsibility is divided between 
the jury and the judge. In Figure 1, judges have more control when the 
district court judges are the decision-makers (shown on the right) than when 
the juries are the decision-makers (shown on the left). 18  Horizontal 
reallocation alters the control over the shifted issue. Judicial determination of 
an issue provides more control to judges. Judges are repeat players in 
litigation and hear the same issue more than a jury selected and seated for a 
single case. Of course, the Seventh Amendment bounds horizontal 
 
 17. To fit reallocation into a simple two-by-two matrix, all deferential standards of 
review are denoted as the same. In reality, there is a difference between the types of 
deferential review such as substantial evidence and clear error. E.g., Frank B. Cross, 
Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1502–03 (2003). 
 18. Changing the decision-maker on an issue between judge and jury is not a 
substantive doctrinal shift per se. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal 
Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 517, 517 (2006) (noting that doctrine comprises “[j]udicial 
opinions [that] create the rules or standards”). The underlying substantive doctrine on the 
shifted issue remains unchanged. In other words, the rules or standards are unchanged; it is 
the evaluator of these rules or standards who changes. 
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reallocation, and more specifically, the extent to which issues may be recalled 
from the jury.19 
Vertical reallocation involves control within the hierarchy of the judicial 
system, namely between lower courts and upper courts. Not all aspects of a 
trial court judgment are reviewed on appeal with the same scrutiny. Courts 
use the standard of review to differentiate among the various appealed 
matters.20 The most permissive standard of review from the perspective of a 
higher court—de novo—permits the upper court to review the matter 
without deference.21 De novo (shown on the top in Figure 1) provides the 
most control for the higher court because it can freely revise findings from 
the court below.22 Other standards of review such as clearly erroneous or 
abuse of discretion (shown on the bottom in Figure 1) provide more control 
to the lower court because the upper court cannot modify the lower 
decisions unless there is clear error. 
1. The Claim Construction Doctrine 
In the mid-1990s, the Federal Circuit desired to make patent law more 
predictable.23 Consequently, this Article argues, the Federal Circuit elevated 
the importance of one aspect of patent litigation: claim construction. Claim 
construction refers to the process of determining the literal scope of a 
 
 19. The Seventh Amendment states: “In Suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no 
fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  
 20. Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 233, 240 (2009) (“If appellate courts examine all of the decisions made below 
without any deference to rulings, then the trial court’s proceedings are meaningless. 
However, a deferential standard of review not only works to preserve the integrity of the 
trial court, it also serves to protect the appellate court’s valuable time and resources.”). 
 21. Id. at 246 (“Courts using de novo review examine the trial court’s application of the 
law without affording the lower court discretion.”). 
 22. Admittedly, very little if anything falls within the top-left box. 
 23. See Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit 
Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (1994) (“I therefore argue that 
our court works best when it so defines generic legal rights that, in most individual 
situations, the parties to a potential lawsuit could, if willing, reason together and agree on the 
likely outcome of prospective litigation. Specifically, the parties’ lawyers could reliably predict 
how our court would ultimately rule on the matter in dispute. Surely, moving in the opposite 
direction—toward more uncertainty of rights, more unpredictability of adjudicatory 
outcomes, and therefore more lawsuits—is an undesirable and ultimately an unsustainable 
result.”). Obviously, there are limits to how predictable patent law can be, especially given 
that it must apply to currently undiscovered technologies. 
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patentee’s rights.24 The word “construction” in claim construction refers to 
interpreting the meaning of the words used in a patent claim. 25  Claim 
construction occurs in various contexts, and perhaps most prominently in 
litigation.26  
The law of claim construction is embodied in a series of canons of 
construction, which are similar to the canons of statutory construction.27 The 
Federal Circuit believed that claim construction was key to making patent law 
 
 24. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1358–60 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“ ‘Claim 
construction’ is for the purpose of explaining and defining terms in the claims, and usually 
requires use of words other than the words that are being defined.”). The word “claim” in 
claim construction refers to the claims of the patent. All patents contain at least one and 
typically multiple claims. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the 
United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 103 (2002) (reporting that a random sample of 
patents issued between 1996 and 1998 had an average of 14.87 claims per patent). The 
claims are each a single sentence written in a technical manner. See U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 706.03(d) (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010). The U.S. Patent Office (Patent 
Office) has detailed formatting and structural rules that apply to claims. Id. §§ 608.01(i)–
.01(o). The exact language in the claims is carefully considered by patent attorneys and the 
Patent Office. Patent attorneys spend substantial time selecting the language to use in patent 
claims. Jason M. Okun, To Thine Own Claim Be True: The Federal Circuit Disaster in Exxon 
Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1335, 1341 (2000) (“It is in 
the process of drafting the claim that the most crucial and close communication occurs 
between the claim drafter and the inventor.”). The Patent Office substantively examines a 
patent application to confirm that it meets the requirements for a patent (including utility, 
patentable subject matter, novelty, non-obviousness, written description, enablement, and 
best mode). During examination, the Patent Office considers the precise claim language 
chosen by the patent applicant. The claims define the outer limit of the patentee’s rights. 35 
U.S.C. § 271 (2006); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 
731 (2009) (“[C]laiming communicates the set to the public to encourage efficient 
investment in the invention, by requiring licensing or abstinence from the set’s embodiment 
and by permitting free use of embodiments not in the set.”). 
 25. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991) (“[T]he construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse 
claim language: in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the 
claims.”). 
 26. In litigation, it is common for the parties to disagree on the meaning of a particular 
word or phrase used in a patent claim. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign 
Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1751 (2009) (“[T]here is 
essentially always a dispute over the meaning of the patent claims.”). 
 27. KIMBERLY A. MOORE, PAUL R. MICHEL & TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK, PATENT 
LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 287–311 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing canons of claim 
construction); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim 
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 144–45 (2005); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and 
Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1047 
n.43 (2003) (“Like canons of statutory construction, canons of claim construction assist the 
court in interpreting language consistently.”).  
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more predictable. 28  If companies know ex ante whether their activities 
infringe on the rights of another, they can plan accordingly. 29  They can 
rationally decide whether or not to engage in an activity after evaluating the 
risks. 30  They can invest in “design around” solutions that add to the 
storehouse of available technologies. A lack of predictability results in 
companies not knowing with reasonable certainty whether their activities 
infringe upon the rights of another, 31  which limits their ability to avoid 
infringement in the first place.32 This uncertainty arguably leads to a loss of 
efficiency, because some companies may avoid making new products 
altogether to eliminate the risk of liability, or pay damages unnecessarily 
when they otherwise could have designed to avoid infringement. 33  To 
alleviate this problem, in the mid-1990s the Federal Circuit focused on 
making patent law more efficient and predictable; to do so, this Article 
argues, the Federal Circuit decided to make claim construction more 
important.34 
It is interesting that the Federal Circuit focused on claim construction as 
a means of introducing greater certainty. This may have been because claim 
construction serves a gatekeeper function in infringement suits: before 
infringement may be determined, the claim must first be construed. 35 
Furthermore, many invalidity defenses require claim construction as a first 
step. Examples include whether the invention is novel, 36  obvious, 37  or 
patentable subject matter.38 As a result, claim construction affects a variety of 
other issues, especially those decided much later in the case. In other words, 
 
 28. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, 
J., dissenting in part) (“By removing lay juries from complex technological decisions, these 
decisions promised to improve the predictability and uniformity of patent law.”). 
 29. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 46–48 (2008). 
 30. See id. at 6–8. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 70–72. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774–75 
(2003) (arguing that the Federal Circuit has used formalism in an effort to make patent law 
more certain and predictable). 
 35. Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In 
determination of patent infringement, as the first step the claims are construed; then, the 
construed claims are compared to the alleged infringing device.”). 
 36. Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The first step 
of an anticipation analysis is claim construction.”). 
 37. E.g., Sys. Div., Inc. v. Teknek LLC, 59 F. App’x 333, 338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing 
Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) 
(“The first step in an obviousness analysis is to construe the language of the claims.”).  
 38. See, e.g., In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1361, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (construing patent 
claims before considering whether the claims were patentable subject matter). 
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a change in the salience of claim construction may impact issues decided 
after and reliant upon claim construction.39 
2. Reallocation of  the Claim Construction Doctrine 
In the early 1990s, claim construction was largely performed by juries.40 
Using jury instructions, the judge would instruct the jury on the tools to 
determine the proper claim construction. 41  The judge would include 
information on the canons of claim construction, but the jury would be 
responsible for applying the canons. The judge still maintained some 
modicum of control through post-trial motions42: if the judge believed that 
the jury’s verdict was unsupported or in substantial error, the judge could 
always grant judgment as a matter of law.43 
 Figure 2 illustrates the status of claim construction in the early 1990s, 
prior to Markman and Cybor. 
 
 39. The Federal Circuit initially focused on claim construction rather than the doctrine 
of equivalents to increase predictability. Claim construction is largely based upon the “four 
corners” of the patent (and the associated prosecution history). In contrast, the doctrine of 
equivalents is based on a variety of factors, including the patent, prosecution history, and the 
operation and structure of the accused device. The court must have believed that it could 
more easily use claim construction to arrive at definite and foreseeable results. 
 40. Edmund J. Sease, Markman Misses the Mark, Miserably, 2004 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 99, 
101 (“The jury was allowed to hear all the evidence and then decide what the term 
‘absorbent’ meant factually in the context of the invention. This was the state of the Federal 
Circuit in 1984. . . . Since Markman in 1996, juries are no longer allowed to determine the 
meaning of a patent claim.”). 
 41. See, e.g., U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(recounting detailed jury instructions provided to construe a means-plus-function claim 
limitation). 
 42. In fact, in the famous Markman case, the trial judge entered judgment as a matter of 
law for the accused infringer after the jury had found for the patentee. Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 
(1996). 
 43. FED. R. CIV. P. 50.  
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Figure 2: Claim Construction in the Early 1990s 
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Figure 2 places claim construction in the early 1990s as a doctrine 
evaluated by the jury and reviewed on appeal with some deference. However, 
the figure slightly oversimplifies the state of patent litigation, for even in the 
early 1990s, district court judges interpreted claims in some instances.44 For 
example, district court judges granted summary judgment in some patent 
cases.45 To decide summary judgment, the court construed the claims and 
compared the properly construed claims to the accused product or method, 
granting all inferences to the non-moving party. 46  Judges also construed 
patent claims when deciding motions for preliminary injunctions, a form of 
equitable relief reserved only for the court.47 Moreover, judges conducted 
bench trials of patent cases without a jury demand, and in doing so construed 
patent claims.48 But, in general, in the early 1990s, claim construction was the 
province of the jury.49 
 
 44. It should be noted that before the late 1980s, there were fewer jury demands and 
most patent cases were bench trials. See Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s Asking?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 850–51, 851 fig.1 (2002). 
 45. See, e.g., Int’l Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg., 991 F.2d 768 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  
 46. See, e.g., UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp., No. 07-CV-2582, 2009 WL 
3122554, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2009) (“At the summary judgment stage, the accused 
device is compared to the construed claims to determine whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Devon Indus., Inc. v. Am. Med. Mfg., 19 F.3d 39 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Al-Site 
Corp. v. Cable Car Sunglasses, 911 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 48. See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores, 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 49. Jeffrey Peabody, Under Construction: Towards a More Deferential Standard of Review in 
Claim Construction Cases, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 505, 506 (2008) (“Prior to 1995, claim construction 
issues were typically decided by the jury.”).  
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At a recent conference, Federal Circuit Judge Jay Plager revealed some 
information about the Federal Circuit’s thinking about claim construction 
just before the mid-1990s.50 According to Judge Plager, the Federal Circuit 
was concerned about the lack of transparency and the “black box” nature of 
the jury process, particularly with regards to claim construction. To reverse 
this problem, the Federal Circuit made major changes in the process of claim 
construction between 1995 and 1998. None of the changes affected the 
substantive claim construction doctrine. Instead, the Federal Circuit 
reallocated the responsibility for claim construction that had rested in juries 
entirely to judges. The reason for this reallocation can be gleaned from the 
judicial opinions themselves. The Federal Circuit held that “it is only 
fair . . . that competitors be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope 
of the patentee’s right to exclude.”51 The Federal Circuit further stated that 
“competitors should be able to rest assured . . . that a judge, trained in the law, 
will . . . apply the established rules of construction, and in that way arrive at 
the true and consistent scope of the patent owner’s rights to be given legal 
effect.”52 
Horizontal and vertical reallocation in patent law began in April 1995 
when the Federal Circuit issued its en banc decision in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments (Markman I). 53  Markman I held that claim construction was 
exclusively reserved for the judge.54 The majority acknowledged that there 
were two lines of cases in the Federal Circuit claim construction precedent, 
one holding that “claim construction may have underlying factual inquiries 
that must be submitted to a jury,” 55  and the second holding that claim 
construction “is strictly a question of law for the court.” 56  The Federal 
Circuit found that the first line was incorrect and should be abandoned 
because it had no firm basis in Federal Circuit precedent. 57  The Federal 
 
 50. Judge S. Jay Plager, Comments at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
Symposium: The Federal Circuit as an Institution (Oct. 30, 2009).  
 51. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 52. Id. at 979 (emphasis added). To be fair, the Federal Circuit is not a single 
monolithic court. For example, there were three judges who declined to join in the Markman 
majority, Judges Mayer and Rader (concurring) and Judge Newman (dissenting). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 979 (“We therefore settle inconsistencies in our precedent and hold that in a 
case tried to a jury, the court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the 
meaning of language used in the patent claim.”). 
 55. Id. at 976. 
 56. Id. at 976–77. 
 57. Id. at 977–78. 
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Circuit also found that claim construction must be reviewed de novo when 
raised in an appeal.58 
The next year, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Federal 
Circuit’s Markman I holding, but on somewhat different reasoning (Markman 
II).59 The Supreme Court supported the Federal Circuit, stating that claim 
construction is “exclusively within the province of the court.” 60  After 
deciding that no Supreme Court precedent controlled the issue, the Court 
decided to “consider both the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries 
and the statutory policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation.”61 
According to the Supreme Court, judges are more likely to properly construe 
a written instrument.62  
While the Supreme Court in Markman II upheld that judges must 
construe claims (horizontal reallocation), it was silent on the standard of 
review of claim construction rulings (vertical reallocation). This silence by the 
Supreme Court led to some short term uncertainty with respect to the 
standard of review of claim construction. Markman I held that it was to be 
reviewed de novo.63 Markman II was silent on this point.64 Nonetheless, a 
majority of Federal Circuit claim construction opinions after Markman II 
found that claim construction was to be reviewed de novo.65 However, a 
minority of cases concluded that there was a factual component to claim 
construction, and those facts were reviewed with deference.66 
In 1998, several years after Markman II, the Federal Circuit en banc 
decided Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, which resolved the standard of review 
issue.67 In Cybor, the Federal Circuit held that claim construction is purely a 
matter of law and should be reviewed de novo on appeal. The Federal Circuit 
stated that most panels after Markman II had followed the de novo 
 
 58. Id. at 979. 
 59. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I ), 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 60. Id. at 372. 
 61. Id. at 384. 
 62. Id. at 388–89. 
 63. Markman I, 52 F.3d at 975. 
 64. Markman II, 517 U.S. 370. 
 65. See, e.g., Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Gen. Am. 
Transp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 66. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 
1555–56 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 
Wiener v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 102 F.3d 534, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Metaulics Sys. Co. v. 
Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 67. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
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standard.68 The Federal Circuit rejected the clearly erroneous standard.69 Just 
as shifting the decision from jury to judge horizontally reallocated control to 
the judges, shifting the standard of review from deference to de novo 
vertically reallocated control from the trial courts to the appellate courts.  
Patent litigation after Markman and Cybor is represented in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Claim Construction After Markman and Cybor 
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Figure 3 makes apparent the quick change in claim construction control. 
Within a three-year window, the Federal Circuit moved claim construction 
from the bottom left box in the matrix—weakest control by the court—to 
the top right box—greatest control by the court. Markman I clearly brought 
horizontal reallocation of claim construction,70 moving it from the left box to 
the right box. A move in this direction gave trial court judges more control 
of the claim construction doctrine.71 Cybor resulted in vertical reallocation, as 
is evidenced by moving upward on the matrix as shown in Figure 3.72 By 
 
 68. Id. at 1454. 
 69. Id. 
 70. The Federal Circuit’s 1995 en banc ruling reallocated the decision-maker for claim 
construction. The Supreme Court’s decision merely affirmed. Consequently, the 1995 date is 
used as the date of reallocation in this Article. 
 71. It also should be noted that Figure 2 is an oversimplification. As noted by the 
Federal Circuit in Markman I, there was a split in authority before 1995. Some cases before 
Markman I had held that claim construction was for the judge. So while all of the post-
Markman cases fall on the right side of Figure 3, a majority but not all of the pre-Markman 
cases fall on the left side. 
 72. Markman I also brought vertical reallocation to claim construction. However, 
Markman II created some uncertainty on the effectiveness of that reallocation. See supra note 
66 and accompanying text. Cybor confirmed it. 
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using both horizontal and vertical reallocation, the Federal Circuit seized 
maximum control over the claim construction doctrine.73  
B. DOCTRINAL DISPLACEMENT IN PATENT LAW 
Doctrinal reallocation generally results in elevating or diminishing the 
importance of a given doctrine. In turn, after one doctrine increases in 
importance, one or more other doctrines generally decrease in importance—
in other words, they are “displaced” by the doctrine that became more 
prominent.74 
1. Causes of  Doctrinal Displacement 
There are three major causes of doctrinal displacement. First, there is a 
practical explanation: litigation constraints. Early in the life of a lawsuit, many 
claims and defenses are raised. After discovery progresses, the parties have an 
opportunity to explore the merits and strengths of their respective cases. 
Later, at critical moments in the lawsuit—for example, summary judgment, 
trial, and appeal—the parties typically focus their claims and defenses. 
Litigants understand that their chances of success increase if they focus their 
arguments on a few winnable points.75 Raising multiple, weaker arguments 
dilutes the strength of the promising ones.76 Word and page limits further 
 
 73. Figure 3 is a useful illustration of the changes occurring in the mid-1990s. 
However, the two-by-two matrix has a few limitations. For the purposes of illustration, each 
time period has been placed in a single box. As noted above, there were some Federal 
Circuit opinions in the early 1990s that reviewed claim construction de novo. See, e.g., Oscar 
Mayer Foods Corp. v. ConAgra Inc., 45 F.3d 443 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (unpublished table 
decision). And after Markman II in 1996, most but not all of the Federal Circuit panels 
considered claim construction using the de novo standard. A very few cases were tried to 
juries before Markman I and decided on appeal after Markman II. For example, in B. Braun 
Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, the entire case was submitted to a jury in 1994. 124 F.3d 
1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The case was not decided by the Federal Circuit until 1997. Id. Almost 
all jury claim constructions had been settled or resolved by Markman II. Thus, perhaps 
Markman and Cybor should be considered together. Using this understanding, most of the 
cases after Markman II should be in the upper right box like those emphasized in Figure 3. 
 74. The corollary is that as one doctrine becomes less important, one or more other 
doctrines are usually enhanced. 
 75. Stephen Easton, Losing Your Appeal, 42 FED. LAW. 24, 31 (1995) (directing 
appellants to “choose the arguments that give you your best chances for success. Force 
yourself to pare the list to two or three strong grounds for reversal (or affirmance). 
Concentrate on them in both the briefs and the oral argument”). 
 76. Id. at 31 (“An attorney who swamps a judge with every possible argument runs the 
risk of causing the judge to miss the best arguments. If you throw a diamond into a mud 
pile, it starts to look pretty muddy.”).  
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push the parties to focus their claims and defenses.77 Parties to an appeal are 
capped on the number of words permitted in the documents they submit to 
the court, and many district courts impose page limits on summary judgment 
or other important briefs. Litigation constraints are driven by the strategic 
decisions by the lawyers of which issues to develop and press.78 
When evaluating which issues to raise, litigants weigh at least two 
strategic considerations. First, litigants consider the likelihood of success on 
the merits of a given issue. Second, litigants consider whether the judge or 
jury will find the issue important in the context of the overall dispute. When 
one doctrine becomes more important, and consequently is raised more 
frequently, other doctrines will be raised less frequently. This displacement of 
other doctrines is normally diffuse. In each case, depending on the particular 
facts and circumstances, a different doctrine may be displaced. Alternatively, 
no doctrine may be displaced, and instead litigants may expand the force with 
which they argue a more limited number of points. Over a series of cases, no 
single doctrine is displaced directly. In these instances, multiple doctrines are 
displaced to a lesser degree, and the displacement proceeds largely unnoticed. 
However, the court can focus the displacement on one or several doctrines 
through additional case law. En banc decisions of an appellate court (or 
decisions of the Supreme Court) are particularly useful to displace a single 
doctrine.  
The litigation constraints rationale may be particularly important with 
claim construction. In patent infringement lawsuits, there are frequently 
numerous potential claim construction disputes. As claim construction 
became more likely to be a critical and winnable issue, litigants often devoted 
several of their limited number of arguments to claim construction disputes. 
Devoting more to claim construction left far less room for other arguments 
and doctrines, thereby enhancing the displacement of other doctrines. 
A second reason for doctrinal displacement is judicial constraints. 
District court judges have limited time and resources and, when appropriate, 
rely on summary judgment to expeditiously resolve lawsuits. When summary 
judgment is available on several possible grounds, judges frequently select the 
“cheapest” basis. The cheapest option expends the least judicial time or 
effort. When one doctrine is increased in importance, the time and effort for 
the judge to consider the various summary judgment avenues change. In 
 
 77. Id. (“In almost every appellate case, the length of the briefs, the time for oral 
argument, and, most importantly, the attention spans of judges with overloaded dockets are 
all severely limited.”). 
 78. As litigation tactics, they are subject to “selection effects” in that displacement may 
affect which cases settle and do not result in a written opinion.  
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patent law, after judges construe claims, they can, for instance, evaluate 
summary judgment on either non-infringement or invalidity. Non-
infringement is typically easier for the judge because there is often a single 
accused product to evaluate, in contrast with a more complicated analysis of 
multiple pieces of prior art under, for example, the obviousness doctrine. 
Furthermore, the judge may already be familiar with the accused product 
from the claim construction process. 79  Thus, judicial claim construction 
lowers the adjudicative cost of non-infringement relative to other defenses. 
For these reasons, non-infringement is commonly the preferred route to 
dispose of patent cases. Non-infringement and invalidity are not substitute 
doctrines. However, they are substitute methods of resolving cases. 
Moreover, even outside of the summary judgment context, judges may 
strategically choose which doctrine to use to dispose of the case. In situations 
in which the standard of review differs for the two doctrines, district court 
judges may rely upon the doctrine afforded more deference on appeal to 
reduce the risk of reversal.80 
Other academic literature supports the view that courts behave 
strategically in response to systemic changes to patent litigation. Professors 
Matthew Henry and John Turner studied the impact of the creation of the 
Federal Circuit on patent litigation.81 They conducted a time-series analysis of 
decisions from 1953 until 2002. 82  According to Henry and Turner, the 
Federal Circuit, which was created in 1982, was substantially less likely to find 
a patent invalid than its predecessor courts.83 If a district court judge found a 
patent invalid, the Federal Circuit was more likely to reverse than the regional 
circuit courts had been. Henry and Turner assert that, because the tendency 
 
 79. There is some case law stating that the accused product is legally irrelevant to claim 
construction. See, e.g., SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (en banc) (stating that a claim is not to be construed in light of the accused device). 
Other cases expressly permit viewing the accused product to provide further context for the 
claim construction analysis. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 
442 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 80. Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (2007) 
(finding evidence that trial judges choose the bases for their sentencing decisions to protect 
their decision from higher court review); Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of 
Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (2002) (finding support that 
strategic considerations influence trial courts when reviewing decision from the 
Environmental Protection Agency). 
 81. Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 
Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 85 (2006). 
 82. Id. at 88–89. 
 83. Id. at 90. 
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to reverse invalidity findings was well-known, district courts more frequently 
relied on non-infringement to resolve cases after 1982.84  
There is a third explanation for doctrinal displacement: the judge’s role as 
a gatekeeper. In some instances, such as in claim construction after Markman, 
the judge must decide one doctrine before reaching others. These 
downstream doctrines can include doctrines relating to liability and damages. 
If the judge decides the first doctrine in a manner that resolves the dispute, 
the second doctrine need not be reached. For instance, assume that the 
decision-maker for the duty of reasonable care requirement in tort law was 
shifted from the jury to the judge. Thereafter, judges if they so desired could 
dispose of negligence actions without a jury trial on the basis that no duty 
was owed to the defendant. In this example, the doctrines of negligence and 
damages could be displaced due to the judge’s gatekeeping role. 
The gatekeeper theory permits extreme displacement of a doctrine. The 
displaced doctrine does not merely fall incrementally in the hierarchy of 
doctrines. A slight decrease would be consistent with the litigation 
constraints theory alone; rather, the gatekeeper theory adds that the doctrine 
drops substantially. A reallocation can drop another previously important 
doctrine below numerous other unaffected doctrines. And substitute 
doctrines that address the same equity concerns are strong candidates for 
displacement. When one doctrine becomes more prominent, the court can 
use it extensively. Substitute doctrines are not needed as much, and 
subsequently diminish in stature. 
Doctrinal displacement may also be enhanced with the rise in summary 
judgment of another doctrine. If summary judgment is granted for the 
defendant on a particular defense, no jury trial may be necessary in the case. 
Doctrines which would have been evaluated by the jury become moot. Thus, 
increasing the grants of summary judgment has the effect of displacing 
doctrines typically considered by the jury downstream of the summary 
judgment decision.  
The litigation constraints, judicial constraints, and gatekeeper 
explanations for doctrinal displacement are interrelated. When litigants know 
that the court acts as a gatekeeper before a doctrine is reached, they are more 
likely to downplay it. Instead, litigants focus their primary efforts on the 
gatekeeping doctrine. Similarly, when litigants understand that courts prefer 
to grant summary judgment on a particular basis, they are likely to file 
motions on that basis more often. Consequently, litigation realities amplify 
 
 84. Id. at 103. 
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the effect of the gatekeeper. As such, all three theories support the same 
result—the displacement of one doctrine as another gains importance.85 
2. The Displaced Doctrine: The Doctrine of  Equivalents 
The doctrine of equivalents permits a finding of infringement even if the 
accused device or method does not literally fall within the scope of the 
construed patent claims.86 Instead, a device or method may infringe under 
the doctrine of equivalents if it performs “substantially the same function in 
substantially the same way to obtain the same result” as the patented 
invention.87 Thus, the doctrine of equivalents permits an expansion of patent 
rights beyond the literal scope of the patent claims. One purpose of the 
doctrine of equivalents is to protect patentees from those who seek “to evade 
liability for infringement by making only insubstantial changes to a patented 
invention.” 88  The Supreme Court explained that without the doctrine of 
equivalents, a patent would be “a hollow and useless thing” and 
“unscrupulous copyist[s]” would be “encourage[d].” 89  At the onset of 
litigation, most patentees allege infringement both literally and under the 
doctrine of equivalents, with the latter being a fallback position.90 
The Federal Circuit endorsed the doctrine of equivalents in 1995, nearly 
simultaneously with the claim construction reallocation resulting from 
Markman. In Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., the Federal 
Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed a jury verdict of infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents.91 In a 7–5 ruling, the majority held that an exception 
to the doctrine of equivalents known as prosecution history estoppel did not 
apply. 92  The Federal Circuit also declined to reallocate the doctrine of 
equivalents to the judge, instead holding that the doctrine of equivalents was 
 
 85. An important question is whether displacement is intentional or an unintended 
consequence. This Article cannot answer that question with any certainty. However, the fact 
that no court has acknowledged displacement leads me to believe it is unintentional.  
 86. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39–40 (1997). 
 87. Graver Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (quoting 
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1992)). An accepted alternative test for 
the doctrine of equivalents is whether there are insubstantial differences between the accused 
device or method and the claimed invention. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 24. Another 
relevant consideration is the known interchangeability of the elements. 
 88. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002). 
 89. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607. 
 90. Allison et al., supra note 2, at 977. (“Rather, a patentee is almost always arguing the 
doctrine of equivalents as an alternative to a theory of literal infringement.”). 
 91. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1528–29 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 92. Id. at 1514. 
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a jury question.93 In the years that followed, first the Supreme Court and then 
the Federal Circuit began limiting the reach of the doctrine of equivalents.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court 
issued several significant decisions involving the doctrine of equivalents.94 
These cases, in turn, placed legal limits—administered by judges—on when 
the doctrine of equivalents is applicable. First, in 1997, the Supreme Court 
decided Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis, which reversed the Federal Circuit’s 
en banc decision.95 In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court held that the All 
Element Rules must be employed,96 meaning that each claim element must 
be present in the accused device or method either literally or equivalently.97 
Prior to this Supreme Court opinion, the Federal Circuit had not consistently 
and stringently applied the All Elements Rule, and sometimes it permitted 
patentees to loosely argue that the accused product was equivalent to the 
invention as a whole.98 
Thereafter, in 2000, the Federal Circuit en banc voted in Festo v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. to bar the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents for certain claim elements.99 The Federal Circuit found that the 
doctrine of equivalents was not available if a claim element had been 
amended during the process of examination by the Patent Office. 100 
 
 93. Id. at 1522 (“In answer to the second question posed by this court en banc, 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury 
in a jury trial with proper instructions, and to be decided by the judge in a bench trial.”). 
 94. For a good discussion of the development of the doctrine of equivalents during 
this time frame, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 
164–69 (2005); Michael Meurer & Craig A. Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: 
A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947 (2005); Petherbridge, Doctrine 
of Equivalents, supra note 2, at 1385–1393. 
 95. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 96. Id. at 40 (“The determination of equivalence should be applied as an objective 
inquiry on an element-by-element basis.”). 
 97. Id. at 21 (“Nearly 50 years ago, this Court in [Graver Tank] . . . set out the modern 
contours of what is known in patent law as the ‘doctrine of equivalents.’ Under this doctrine, 
a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim 
may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the 
accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.”). 
 98. Cf. Joseph R. Re & Lynda J. Zadra-Symes, Infringement Under the Doctrine of 
Equivalents: The Federal Circuit’s First Ten Years, 785 ALI-ABA PAT. L. & LITIG. 77, 93 (1992) 
(“The Federal Circuit has applied the element-by-element approach it adopted in banc in 
Pennwalt [in 1987] almost consistently since that decision.”). 
 99. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 100. Id. at 563 (“Therefore, an amendment that narrows the scope of a claim for any 
reason related to the statutory requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history 
estoppel with respect to the amended claim element.”). 
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Specifically, if the patentee had amended a particular element for “reasons 
relating to patentability”—such as to convince the Patent Office that the 
claim was new—then no equivalence was available for such element.101 After 
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court in 2002 rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
categorical test. 102  Instead, the Supreme Court held that a rebuttable 
presumption applies to any claim amended for reasons relating to 
patentability. 103  However, the Supreme Court’s flexible and rebuttable 
presumption approach has been very difficult for patentees to overcome.104 
Thus, while the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid test, the 
effect of these rulings has been a substantial reduction in instances in which 
the doctrine of equivalents is applicable.105 
In sum, the doctrine of equivalents, a fairness doctrine juries apply, is 
arguably inconsistent with a patent system premised on predictability and on 
clear prior notice of the scope of rights.106 In the years since Markman, there 
have been several Federal Circuit and Supreme Court cases touching on the 
doctrine of equivalents. These cases introduced substantive restrictions on 
 
 101. Id. at 569 (“When a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel with 
regard to a claim element, there is no range of equivalents available for the amended claim 
element. Application of the doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is completely barred 
(a ‘complete bar’).”). 
 102. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 723–25 
(2002). 
 103. Id. at 741 (“When the patentee has chosen to narrow a claim, courts may presume 
the amended text was composed with awareness of this rule and that the territory 
surrendered is not an equivalent of the territory claimed. In those instances, however, the 
patentee still might rebut the presumption that estoppel bars a claim of equivalence. The 
patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not 
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the 
alleged equivalent.”). 
 104. Christopher A. Harkins, Choosing Between the Advice of Counsel Defense to Willful Patent 
Infringement or the Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel: A Bridge or the Troubled Waters?, 5 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 210, 218 (2007) (“[W]hen a claim amendment is an amendment 
related to patentability, there arises a presumption of estoppel against the doctrine of 
equivalents, which presumption may only be overcome in a few ‘narrow ways.’ ”). 
 105. Daniel H. Shulman & Donald W. Rupert, “Vitiating” the Doctrine of Equivalents: A 
New Patent Law Doctrine, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 457, 459 (2003) (“These other decisions, which 
have become more and more frequent in the last few years, limit the DOE by effectively 
creating a per se rule as to what constitutes an equivalent.”). In 2001, the Federal Circuit 
continued narrowing the reach of the doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit en banc 
eliminated the doctrine of equivalents for a different type of claim element—no equivalents 
are available for subject matter disclosed in a patent specification but not literally claimed. 
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (2002) (en banc). 
 106. Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 1, 5 (2010) (“The express purpose of [the doctrine of equivalents] is to ensure fair 
and adequate protection to the patentee and to solidify the patent incentive.”); cf. Meurer & 
Nard, supra note 94, at 1953–54. 
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the doctrine of equivalents.107 However, the displacement of the doctrine of 
equivalents, which led to its decreasing importance, occurred after Markman 
I, well before any direct assaults on the doctrine in these cases. For the most 
part, these cases reduced the occasions on which a patentee may successfully 
raise infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.108 But the displacement 
had already occurred. While they surely further diminished the stature of the 
doctrine, they occurred subsequent to the doctrinal displacement.  
Other scholars have empirically studied the success of patentees who 
attempt to rely upon the doctrine of equivalents, and their data supports the 
theory that the doctrine of equivalents has diminished in several respects. 
Petherbridge found that by 2007, patentees only rarely succeeded under the 
doctrine of equivalents.109 Rather than tying the decrease in success to the 
Markman decision, Petherbridge traces it to the Festo decision in 2000, which 
provided strong limits on the availability of the doctrine of equivalents.110 
Petherbridge also posited that the decline in the doctrine of equivalents is 
directly related to the rise in power of claim construction.111 As the Federal 
Circuit increased its rate of modifying lower court claim constructions, it 
decreased the rate of success of a patentee on the doctrine of equivalents.112 
However, Petherbridge did not provide an explanation of why the increased 
importance of claim construction decreased the success rate on the doctrine 
of equivalents.113 Petherbridge, instead, argues that an intra-circuit dispute on 
 
 107. John R. Thomas, Claim Re-construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman 
Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 159 (2005). 
 108. See Fromer, supra note 24, at 735–38; Nicole S. Robbins, The Curtailment of the 
Doctrine of Equivalents: Courts Emphasize the Public Notice Function of Patent Claims, 35 SUFFOLK L. 
REV. 323, 339–43 (2001). 
 109. Petherbridge, Doctrine of Equivalents, supra note 2, at 1386–92. From reviewing the 
figures in Petherbridge’s articles, it appears that the decline did not commence until at least 
Markman I. 
 110. Id. at 1390–92 (reporting that logistical regression predicts that changes in 
procedural circumstances in the doctrine of equivalents largely explain the decline).  
 111. Petherbridge, Claim Construction Effect, supra note 2, at 236.  
 112. Id. (“[R]egression analysis provides evidence that the Federal Circuit’s rejection of 
lower court claim construction determinations most strongly predicts a decrease in 
predictability, while other variables that could have explained it, like changes in the rules 
surrounding the doctrine of equivalents have either no impact or predict predictability rather 
than unpredictability.”). 
 113. In fact, Petherbridge argues that the procedural changes relating to claim 
construction did not cause the decline in the doctrine of equivalents. See Petherbridge, Claim 
Construction Effect, supra note 2, at 244 (“Procedural changes (e.g., increases in relative rates of 
incoming summary judgments potentially wrought by the Markman/Cybor framework) do 
not provide a strong explanation for the decline in doctrinal stability.”).  
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claim construction methodology appeared around 2000, which affected the 
doctrine of equivalents.114 
Allison and Lemley draw somewhat different conclusions from their 
empirical study of outcomes of doctrine of equivalents cases.115 They studied 
district court and Federal Circuit doctrine of equivalents decisions in three 
periods surrounding the Festo decision.116 Allison and Lemley assert that the 
multiple substantive changes in the doctrine of equivalents law had 
“surprisingly little effect on the actual outcome of doctrine of equivalents 
cases.”117 More significant to the present Article, Allison and Lemley state 
that by the late 1990s, patentee assertions under the doctrine of equivalents 
almost never prevailed at trial or on appeal.118  
Allison and Lemley argue that Markman killed the doctrine of 
equivalents.119 They speculate that after Markman, district court judges were 
inclined to err on the side of granting summary judgment of non-
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.120 There was rarely a dispute 
about the structure or function of the accused product. So after the judge 
construed the claims, summary judgment of literal infringement or non-
infringement was often appropriate.121 But granting summary judgment of no 
literal infringement would not resolve the entire lawsuit. To end the lawsuit, 
the court had to consider the patentee’s charge of infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents. 122  Allison and Lemley argue that judges “will be 
doubly inclined to hold for the accused infringer” on the doctrine of 
equivalents as the only way to dispose of the case.123 Allison and Lemley’s 
explanation for the decline of the doctrine of equivalents is similar to the 
gatekeeper theory for displacement, and their empirical results are consistent 
with doctrinal displacement. However, their explanation is incomplete as 
they focus only on the trial court, not the appellate court, as a gatekeeper. 
They also do not fully articulate the litigation and judicial constraints aspects 
of displacement. 
 
 114. Id. at 245 (“The evidence to this point suggests that [the change in the realm of 
claim construction] more strongly involves changes in claim construction jurisprudence than 
it does changes in the rules of the doctrine of equivalents.”).  
 115. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2.  
 116. Id. at 963–66. 
 117. Id. at 957. 
 118. See id. at 970–71.  
 119. See id. at 977–78.  
 120. See id. at 977.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
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So why was the doctrine of equivalents displaced, and not some other 
doctrine? One explanation is that claim construction and the doctrine of 
equivalents serve similar functions—both are directed to the scope of 
protection for a patentee. Claim construction provides the literal reach of the 
patent. The doctrine of equivalents permits the patentee a further reach, as 
long as the differences between the literal claim scope and the accused 
product are insubstantial. When construing claims, the judge often knows the 
structure of the accused products. Using this knowledge, the judge may 
provide a broader construction to ambiguous claim language so as to avoid 
confronting the doctrine of equivalents. In other words, courts may have 
found these doctrines to be substitutes for each other. And as previously 
noted, substitute doctrines are strong candidates for displacement.124  
A related explanation is that claim construction has arguably expanded to 
encompass the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents permits 
the patentee to cover items that perform substantially the same function 
although they have different structure. For instance, a stent with an oval 
cross-section might be found equivalent to a claimed one with a “circular” 
cross-section. After Markman I, claim construction is performed solely by 
judges. Juries did not need to provide a written record of their claim 
construction. Judges, when forced to do this, regularly defined the claim 
terms—structural terms—using functional definitions.125 Post Markman I, the 
judicial craft of claim construction has subsumed the doctrine of equivalents. 
Consequently, the need for the doctrine of equivalents was effectively 
eliminated.  
As outlined above, Allison and Lemley provide a different reason for the 
displacement of the doctrine of equivalents. After the judge steeped herself 
in the technology and construed the claims, she was less inclined to submit 
the case to a jury. 126  However, to fully resolve the case, the doctrine of 
equivalents needed to be decided. 127  Thus, as a practical matter, judges 
quickly decided the doctrine of equivalents under the guise of summary 
judgment to keep the case from the jury.128 If this is true, one would expect 
less success on the doctrine of equivalents after Markman hearings became 
important.129 While Markman mandated that district court judges construe the 
 
 124. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 125. An exception to this is organic chemistry, a field in which structure can be defined 
by structure alone.  
 126. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 977.  
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. at 977–98. 
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patent claims, it left open when and how judges do so. Some courts adopted 
local patent rules that specified the timing of claim construction.130 Many 
judges elected to hold separate hearings, often called Markman hearings.131 
These hearings solely focused on the meaning of the claims, and they are 
typically divorced from consideration of the issues of infringement, validity, 
or enforceability.132  Markman hearings could last up to several weeks and 
sometimes included live witness testimony. Other judges elected to construe 
the patent claims simultaneously with deciding dispositive motions. These 
judges often did not hold a Markman hearing but, instead, decided the issue 
of claim construction based on the written record developed during summary 
judgment briefing. The Federal Circuit has taken no position on the timing 
and procedure used by district courts to construe claims, and it has approved 
of both major approaches.133 The sole Federal Circuit mandate was that claim 
construction must be performed by the court, not the jury.134 Judges who 
held separate hearings may have been more likely to learn the technology and 
have a greater desire to dispose of the case in its entirety after claim 
construction. Because the substantive changes to the doctrine of equivalents 
in Festo are so close in time to the rise of separate hearings, it would be 
difficult to directly test whether the hearings are correlated with the 
displacement. 
III. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The findings of this Article are based upon data derived from three 
databases: (1) a claim construction appellate decision database consisting of 
information from all published and unpublished claim construction decisions 
from 1991 until 2008; (2) an appellate issue database consisting of 
information for all electronically available Federal Circuit decisions from the 
 
 130. See, e.g., N.D. CAL., P.R. 4-5, 4-6 (2010); E.D. TEX., P.R. 4-5, 4-6 (2010); N.D. GA., 
P.R. 6.5, 6.6 (2009); W.D. PA., P.R. 4 (2009); S.D. TEX., P.R. 4.5, 4.6 (2008); E.D. N.C., P.R. 
304.5, 304.6 (2010). 
 131. William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman: A Prescription for the 
Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 55, 59 (1999). 
 132. See Sease, supra note 40, at 99. 
 133. The Federal Circuit has even authorized the court to conduct rolling claim 
construction, revising an initial claim construction after the record was more fully developed. 
See, e.g., SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“After discovery the court expects the parties to refine the disputed issues and learn more 
about the claim terms and technology, at which point a more accurate claim construction 
can be attempted.”). 
 134. Lee & Krug, supra note 131, at 56–57 (noting that Markman did not proscribe any 
particular timing to claim construction, and further noting that district courts have construed 
patent claims as early as the onset of litigation and as late as prior to jury instruction). 
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years 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000; and (3) a word count appellate database 
consisting of published appeals following grants of summary judgment from 
1987 until 2004. The appellate issue and word count appellate databases were 
created for this Article. This Part describes the databases and the process for 
constructing them. It then discusses limitations of the study including 
limitations of empirical legal studies of appellate court decisions more 
generally. 
A. THE DATABASES 
1. The Claim Construction Appellate Decision Database 
The claim construction appellate decision database includes all claim 
construction appellate decisions from district court litigation135 from January 
1, 1991 until December 31, 2008.136  Overall, the database contains 1,288 
Federal Circuit decisions, including 157 decisions before Markman I. 137 
Appeals are included regardless of the procedural posture—whether resolved 
via preliminary injunction, summary judgment, trial, or otherwise. The 
database only includes appeals from district courts. Accordingly, it does not 
include appeals from the United States Patent & Trademark Office, the 
Court of Federal Claims, or the International Trade Commission. 
The claim construction appellate decision database includes all merits 
resolutions by the Federal Circuit of claim construction appeals from district 
court litigation. The Federal Circuit can resolve appeals involving claim 
construction through several mechanisms including a precedential written 
opinion, a non-precedential written opinion, and a summary affirmance. The 
database includes precedential and non-precedential opinions, as well as 
appeals resolved without a written opinion. A detailed explanation of how 
 
 135. The dataset only includes utility patents. Appellate review of claim construction of 
design patents (and plant patents) is relatively infrequent. Because claim construction of 
design patents is substantively different from claim construction of utility patents, design 
(and plant) patents were excluded from the present study. 
 136. The claim construction appellate decision database has been used in several 
previous studies. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 237–41 (2008) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect]; David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study 
of Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International 
Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699 (2009); David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman 
Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal 
Rates].  
 137. The reliability and validity of the original database is high. See Schwartz, Practice 
Makes Perfect, supra note 136, at 272–73. 
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the original dataset was derived is available elsewhere138 and consequently, 
not repeated here. 
2. The Appellate Issue Database 
The appellate issue database identifies the issues discussed in Federal 
Circuit decisions from the years 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000. The years were 
selected to include equally spaced samples, before and after Markman I and 
II.  
The database records specific issues explored in all electronically-available 
Federal Circuit opinions, both precedential and non-precedential, during 
those years. The issues are generally identified by headings in the opinions 
such as anticipation, obviousness, inequitable conduct, and infringement. 
Most cases involved multiple issues. Claim construction may be analyzed as a 
precursor to any of these issues. Even if the Federal Circuit’s analysis did not 
use a heading, if the opinion discussed the issue, it was included in the 
database. For claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents, an opinion 
was not recorded unless there was a specific discussion in the opinion 
analyzing the relevant law or facts.139 A bare bones recitation in an opinion, 
such as one which notes that infringement was not shown literally or under 
the doctrine of equivalents or that the court must construe the claims, was 
not recorded.140 
To develop the appellate issue database, a Lexis query was performed to 
locate potentially relevant cases. 141  A human coder recorded the issues 
 
 138. For a thorough discussion of the selection, coding, and reliability of the dataset, see 
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect, supra note 136, at 269–74. For a discussion of particular issues 
with locating earlier (pre-1995) cases, see Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, supra note 
136, at 1073, 1091–92.  
 139. Technically, claim construction is a doctrine, not an issue. See Tiller & Cross, supra 
note 18 (discussing the distinction between doctrine and issue.) As for the doctrine of 
equivalents, the Supreme Court itself uses the phrase “doctrine of equivalents.” In coding the 
appellate issue database, claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents were included, in 
addition to the general issues of §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112; literal infringement; and 
inequitable conduct. 
 140. The Federal Circuit in some cases noted that an issue was briefed but would not be 
decided. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma, L.P. v. Faulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (“Because we have upheld the district court’s determination that the asserted claims of 
the ’360 patent are invalid, it is unnecessary to address Faulding’s cross-appeal from the 
district court’s finding of infringement.”). These undecided issues were excluded from the 
database. 
 141. In the CAFC database, the following query was executed: “court and date(geq 
(1/1/1991) and leq (12/31/1991)) and not name(trademark or department or secretary or 
“international trade” or “merit systems” or veteran or “federal claims” or “in re”) and 
not(“patent appeals and interferences” or “united states claims court”).” Because summary 
affirmances did not discuss any issues, they were not responsive to the Lexis search. 
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discussed by the Federal Circuit in every case. Opinions from merits 
decisions of district courts were included, regardless of whether the district 
court resolved the case via preliminary injunction, summary judgment, bench 
trial, or jury trial.142 The appellate issue database includes 297 total opinions, 
including 54 opinions from 1991; 55 from 1994; 90 from 1997; and 98 from 
2000. 
3. The Word Count Appellate Database 
The word count appellate database includes specific word count 
information about certain appellate decisions from 1987 until 2004.143 The 
database notes the number of words in each opinion devoted to claim 
construction and the number of words devoted to the doctrine of 
equivalents. Words devoted to the doctrine of equivalents includes discussion 
about any test or argument relating to the doctrine of equivalents including 
prosecution history estoppel limitation. The database also records the total 
word count discussing all issues on appeal, typically organized in the opinion 
under the heading “Discussion.” Most opinions in the database have separate 
headings under which the patent and claims were introduced. Consequently, 
the claim construction word count typically does not include a recitation of 
the claim as a whole. 
To attempt to keep as much as possible constant across the 1987 until 
2004 time period, only appeals reviewing a grant of summary judgment are 
included. No appeals from jury or bench trials are included.144 Thus, the 
word count appellate database excludes decisions in which the jury construed 
the claims or the jury decided the doctrine of equivalents. If all opinions were 
included, including those reviewing jury verdicts, we may expect a change in 
word count due to the doctrinal reallocation of claim construction alone. 
This is because there would be a larger appellate record after the judge 
construed the claims. In other words, after Markman, the record in a jury case 
would include a judicial claim construction. In contrast, the record from jury 
trials before Markman frequently did not, as the judge did not expressly 
 
 142. Only appeals from utility patent litigation at the district court were included. Non-
merit appeals, such as from motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, were 
omitted. Cases in which liability and attorney fees generated separate appeals were only 
included in the dataset for the liability appeal. 
 143. The beginning year of 1987 was selected because jury demands in patent cases were 
less frequent before the late 1980s. See Moore, supra note 44, at 851 fig.1. 
 144. In some cases, summary judgment is granted in part, such as for literal 
infringement, and denied in part. In these cases, a trial is conducted on the doctrine of 
equivalents. This sort of case was excluded. Only cases in which claim construction and the 
doctrine of equivalents was resolved on summary judgment were included. 
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construe the claims. Because there is more to review, we may expect more 
words in the appellate opinions. There is not a similar problem in summary 
judgment appeals. In summary judgment cases before and after Markman, the 
judge construed the claims. By using summary judgment cases only, this 
concern is substantially alleviated. However, the study assumes that the 
district courts would grant summary judgment in the same cases before and 
after Markman.  
The database is limited to precedential opinions because non-precedential 
opinions typically are not as well organized. They often lack the organization 
present in precedential opinions, such as a separate “Discussion” section. 
This presents potential coding difficulties. Furthermore, the non-precedential 
opinions often are very cursory, especially relative to precedential opinions. 
Because the opinions are short, the use or omission of introductory 
sentences to either the claim construction or doctrine of equivalents 
discussion could materially alter the results. For this reason, a word count of 
non-precedential opinions was not deemed to be as useful. 
To develop the word count appellate database, an overbroad query was 
performed on Lexis to locate potentially relevant cases. 145  Thereafter, a 
human coder read every case146 to confirm that all of the following were true: 
(1) the appeal was from a decision of a federal district court; (2) the federal 
district court resolved the lawsuit on summary judgment; and (3) the appeal 
addressed either claim construction or the doctrine of equivalents, or both. 
The coder noted the number of words devoted to each issue, the number of 
words in the “Discussion” section which typically included a discussion of all 
issues on appeal, as well as the number of words in the entire opinion. The 
“Discussion” section did not include background information about the 
patent, technology, or procedural posture of the case. The recitation of the 
claim itself was not counted as part of the claim construction analysis. Words 
in an alternative opinion, such as concurring or dissenting opinions, were not 
counted. The word count appellate database includes word count 
information from 183 opinions. 
 
 145. In the CAFC database, the following query was executed: “claim w/10 (constru! or 
interp!) and (doctrine w/5 equivalents) and “summary judgment” and date(geq (1/1/1987) 
and leq (12/31/2004)).” 
 146. Several significant en banc decisions were omitted to avoid skewing the sample. 
These included Markman, Warner-Jenkinson, Cybor, Festo, and Johnson & Johnston. The appeal in 
each of these cases only involved one of the doctrines, and the word count of the discussion 
in each was substantial.  
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B. LIMITATIONS OF THE DATABASES AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF 
APPELLATE DECISIONS 
All projects involving empirical studies of legal decisions have limitations 
and the present study is no exception. First, patent litigation is extremely 
complex. Typically, there are numerous issues raised by the parties. These 
issues are often fact-specific for each case. For example, patent litigation 
between branded and generic drug manufacturers differs from patent 
litigation over a business method patent held by a non-practicing entity. Not 
only is the underlying technology different in these scenarios, but the parties’ 
strategic goals vary as well. Consequently, it is difficult to make 
generalizations about patent litigation from the study of individual cases. 
Second, the present Article uses data gathered through content analysis 
of judicial opinions, which has well-known limitations. 147  These include 
unobserved reasoning, strategic behavior, and selection bias.148 Judge Harry 
Edwards argues that empirical methods are not useful to understanding 
judicial decision-making.149 He argues that statistics cannot distinguish among 
extralegal factors that affect judicial decision-making.150 These unobserved 
factors include the state of the case record on appeal and the judicial 
deliberations that preceded the opinion.151 He also argues that most empirical 
legal studies of case law lack firm support because they exclude summary 
affirmances. In the present study, the claim construction appellate decision 
database includes summary affirmances; however, the word count appellate 
database and appellate issue database do not. By definition, there are no 
words to count in a summary affirmance. For the appellate issue database 
and the related analysis, the study assumes that the issues raised in summary 
affirmances and opinions are the same, an assumption which may not be 
correct. 
 
 147. Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 63, 105–06 (2008) (discussing the limitations of content analysis as part of 
their call for greater use of content analysis). 
 148. For a discussion of these limitations, see R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the 
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1105, 1128–29 (2004). 
 149. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt 
To Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009). 
 150. Id. at 1899 (“Legal scholars remain interested in trying to use empirical methods—
most notably the statistical analysis of case outcomes—to understand the effect of extralegal 
factors on appellate decisionmaking. In our view, the principal problem with such empirical 
legal analyses is that they cannot distinguish between legal and extralegal factors without 
considering and accurately accounting for the most important determinants of appellate 
decisionmaking: (1) the case records on appeal, (2) the applicable law, (3) controlling 
precedent, and (4) judicial deliberations.”). 
 151. Id. 
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Separately, patent law changed in many ways in the last twenty years. The 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit issued numerous substantive decisions 
that altered the law, only some of which are described by this Article. 
Changes to one doctrine may cause substantive effects on the law in other 
doctrines. Furthermore, Congress also amended the Patent Act several times 
during the time period of this study. These changes include adjusting how to 
calculate the patent term 152  and requiring publication of most patent 
applications before issuance.153  
Each of these changes may affect patent litigant strategies and 
substantive patent law doctrines. Because patent litigation as a whole is so 
complex, it is incredibly complicated to develop and test empirical models. 
This complexity is especially prevalent when multiple doctrines in patent law 
are interrelated and studied simultaneously. Changes in precedent can alter 
lawyers’ behavior in drafting patents. Furthermore, changes in precedent can 
also influence party behavior in litigation. Thus, the patent litigation system is 
dynamic and, over time, the types of lawsuits brought will change. 
Another limitation is that the changes studied involving claim 
construction and the doctrine of equivalents are endogenous to the Federal 
Circuit. In other words, while this Article termed Markman and Cybor as the 
cause of doctrinal reallocation and displacement, the court itself made these 
changes. As the Federal Circuit made the Markman I and Cybor decisions, as 
well as the subsequent opinions studied in this Article, the events are not 
truly independent. No empirical methodology can correct for this. 
Furthermore, this Article does not differentiate among the various judges on 
the Federal Circuit; rather, the Federal Circuit is treated as a single static 
court. While the data are largely consistent with the propounded hypotheses, 
this Article makes no claims regarding causation. To the extent it makes any 
assertions, it is limited to mere correlation. The explanations for the 
correlations deserve further empirical and theoretical scrutiny. 
Another limitation stems from general changes in litigation over the 
studied time period. Even outside of patent lawsuits, litigation in general has 
increased since the early 1990s. For example, there were approximately 
265,000 lawsuits filed in federal court in fiscal year 1992.154 In contrast, in 
fiscal year 2008, there were approximately 350,000 lawsuits, an increase of 
 
 152. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 532(a), § 154, 108 Stat. 
4809, 4983–85 (1994). 
 153. Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501, 1536 
(1999) (enacting into law the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, S. 1948, 106th 
Cong., tit. IV, sec. 4502, § 122 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006))). 
 154. U.S. District Court—Judicial Caseload Profile, UNITED STATES COURTS (Apr. 1998), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cms.pl (accessed by choosing “ALL DISTRICT 
COURTS” from the dropdown menu and pressing the “Generate” button). 
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about twenty-five percent.155 Total federal case appeals also slightly increased 
in a generally linear fashion between the early 1990s and 2008.156 The rate of 
summary judgment in all litigation also may have changed over time.157  
In addition to the changing nature of patent and civil litigation over time, 
any study of appellate decisions has certain inherent limitations. These 
limitations include most notably a potential selection bias. 158  Because 
previous articles described in detail the potential selection effect, it will be 
only briefly discussed here.159  First, appellate decisions are not a random 
sample of all patent disputes or all patent infringement complaints. 
Obviously, in real-world patent litigation, in each case the merits, the parties, 
and the parties’ resources differ. 160  Each of these factors affects which 
disputes become lawsuits, which lawsuits proceed through final, appealable 
judgment, and which decisions are appealed. The closer cases, such as those 
fifty-fifty cases wherein either party could prevail (including cases with closer 
claim construction arguments), may be appealed at a higher frequency.161 
However, the present study does not rely upon case outcomes, which 
evaluate the performance of the district court and are susceptible to 
distortion based on selection effects.162 Instead, because this Article examines 
 
 155. U.S. District Court—Judicial Caseload Profile, UNITED STATES COURTS (2008), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2008.pl (accessed by choosing “ALL DISTRICT 
COURTS” from the dropdown menu and pressing the “Generate” button). 
 156. Federal Court Management Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS (2010), http://www. 
uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html.  
 157. Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 141 
(2000) (noting the declining percentage of civil cases proceeding to trial in federal courts 
over time, and tying that to “the emergence of summary judgment as the new fulcrum of 
federal civil dispute resolution”). 
 158. See Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, supra note 136, at 1101–06. 
 159. E.g., Richard S. Gruner, How High Is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources and Meaning of 
Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1003–24 
(2010); Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, supra note 136, at 1101–06; Ted Sichelman, The 
Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1179–83 (2010). 
 160. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 202–05, 250–51 (1998). 
 161. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped To Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9–10 (2001); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of 
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL. STUD. 1, 4, 16 (1984). Other empirical studies have 
reported plaintiff win rates in patent jury trials at nearly seventy percent, contrary to what 
one would expect using the limiting case of the Priest/Klein economic theory. Kimberly A. 
Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
365, 385–86 (2000); see also Alan C. Marco, The Selection Effects (and Lack Thereof) in Patent 
Litigation: Evidence from Trials, 4 TOPICS ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, iss. 1, art. 21 (2004), 
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol4/iss1/art21/ (reporting that there does not 
appear to be a selection bias tending to produce a fifty percent patent infringement win rate, 
but that there does appear to be a selection bias toward fifty percent in the validity win rate). 
 162. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 148, at 1127–29. 
1157_1216_SCHWARTZ_112111 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  4:59 PM 
1190 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26:1157  
appellate choices such as whether to publish an opinion or designate it as 
precedential, and other metrics of solely appellate court decision-making, the 
potential selection effects problem is slightly muted. 
Studying the time period surrounding a major change such as Markman 
also presents difficulties. For example, the cases that survived until an 
appellate decision may have changed across this period. When juries 
performed claim construction, more accused infringers may have settled 
instead of risking a jury ruling.163 After Markman, accused infringers in similar 
cases could more freely litigate claim construction before a judge. As more 
courts utilized a completely separate claim construction hearing, the number 
of litigants willing to proceed through claim construction may have 
increased. For these reasons, the types of cases that resulted in a Federal 
Circuit decision may be different before and after Markman.  
The word count appellate database has a separate concern because it has 
a smaller sized dataset. It currently analyzes word count information from 
less than two hundred Federal Circuit opinions over a fifteen-year period. On 
average, there were about ten opinions per year,164 with more opinions in 
recent years and fewer in earlier years. The small number of observations 
affects the statistical tests performed. Furthermore, word counts in appellate 
decisions only illustrate behavior at the Federal Circuit level. The database 
does not directly report doctrines or word counts raised in the trial court. 
Moreover, because it is limited to cases in which the court granted summary 
judgment, it consists almost entirely of cases wherein the accused infringer 
prevailed at the district court. For each of the foregoing reasons, all results 
and discussion of the data are subject to the limitations discussed in this 
Section. 
IV. DATA ON THE DEMISE OF THE DOCTRINE OF 
EQUIVALENTS 
Using the theories provided in Part II, this Part provides hypotheses on 
the ramifications of these phenomena including hypotheses about the 
doctrine of equivalents. Part IV also sets forth the results of empirical testing 
of the hypotheses. Section IV.A provides the doctrinal reallocation 
hypotheses and results. Section IV.B examines the doctrinal displacement 
hypotheses and results.  
 
 163. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, supra note 136, at 1099. 
 164. There are more than ten claim construction opinions per year. However, the word 
count appellate database was created using only cases in which both claim construction and 
the doctrine of equivalents were discussed.  
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A. REALLOCATION HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS 
This Section examines hypotheses and data that suggest that the 
horizontal and vertical reallocations in Markman and Cybor made claim 
construction more central and important in patent litigation. According to 
the theory proposed in Part II, supra, the horizontal and vertical reallocations 
illustrated in Figure 3 provided more control of claim construction to the 
appellate court. The control gave the Federal Circuit the ability to emphasize 
or deemphasize claim construction in the overall context of patent litigation. 
When confronted with the opportunity, the Federal Circuit elected to make 
claim construction more rather than less important. At first glance, this 
statement seems obvious—claim construction is perhaps the central doctrine 
in patent litigation today. Practitioners and professors who came of age after 
Markman may believe that claim construction was always central to patent 
litigation. However, before Markman, it is debatable whether claim 
construction was as important. 165  This hypothesis tests the conventional 
wisdom that claim construction was always important.166 
The hypotheses derive from the time period around Markman and Cybor. 
The Federal Circuit exerted control over lower courts 167  and over claim 
construction as a result of Markman.168 This Article argues that the Federal 
Circuit enhanced the importance of claim construction to increase the 
predictability of patent litigation. This explanation is consistent with the 
remarks of Judge Plager,169 and with the statements in the Markman opinion 
itself.170 Generally, a court using its control to increase the importance of a 
 
 165. See Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 360 (“It was not until the 1995 en banc Federal Circuit decision in 
Markman . . . that [the notice function of patents] reached the forefront of patent law 
jurisprudence.”). 
 166. See, e.g., Edward M. O’Toole, How To Prepare for and Conduct Markman Hearings 2006, 
in HOW TO PREPARE & CONDUCT MARKMAN HEARINGS 2006, at 175, 207 (PLI Patents, 
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 873, 2006) (“After 
all, claim construction has always been an important aspect of resolution of patent disputes, 
and most patent cases continue, as they always have, to turn on claim construction—
impacting the issue of infringement or validity, or both.”). 
 167. Legal doctrine is taught by higher courts to lower courts. See Tonja Jacobi & 
Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 326 (2007).  
 168. John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative 
Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 123 (2000) (“Together Markman and Cybor 
have . . . centralized judicial power to interpret claims in the Federal Circuit.”). 
 169. See Plager, supra note 50. 
 170. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc) (Mayer, J., concurring) (noting that the majority opinion attempts “to free patent 
litigation from the ‘unpredictability’ of jury verdicts”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
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doctrine will perform certain observable tasks. Empirically testing whether 
these tasks occurred in patent law permits evaluation of the theory. 
The Article sets forth infra three hypotheses relating to doctrinal 
reallocation. The first hypothesis is that, after Markman, the Federal Circuit 
issued a greater percentage of written claim construction opinions. The 
second is that, after Markman, the Federal Circuit issued a greater percentage 
of precedential claim construction opinions. The third is that, after Markman, 
a greater percentage of claim construction appeals arose from summary 
judgment. Each of these hypotheses, both separately and together, is 
consistent with the view that the Federal Circuit made claim construction 
more important after Markman.  
1. Reallocation Hypothesis #1: After Markman I, the Federal Circuit issued 
a greater percentage of  written opinions  
The first hypothesis contends that the Federal Circuit issued a greater 
percentage of written opinions on claim construction after Markman. More 
written opinions signal that the Federal Circuit believes that claim 
construction is important. Obviously, the appellate court can only issue 
opinions on a particular doctrine that the parties raise on appeal. This caps 
the maximum number of opinions an appellate court can generate.  
However, the federal courts of appeal need not produce a written 
opinion in every case. They have the option of affirming without providing a 
written opinion, a procedure known as summary affirmance.171 When using a 
summary affirmance, the appellate court disposes of the case without 
explaining its reasoning. 172  Alternatively, the court may issue a written 
opinion that sets forth the complete basis for its opinion. 173  The court 
chooses which cases to decide by written opinions and which to decide by 
summary affirmance.174 Issuing more written opinions cues litigants of the 
increased importance of the doctrine. A greater percentage of claim 
construction appeals were (and will continue to be) resolved by written 
opinions after Markman.  
 
 171. See FED. CIR. R. 36.  
 172. Pamela S. Karlan, Comment, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of 
Caperton, 123 HARV. L. REV. 80, 83 (2009); see, e.g., Sutton v. Nokia Corp., No. 2010-1218, 
2010 WL 5230901 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming decision of lower tribunal without providing 
any explanation). 
 173. FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, & JUDGING 165 (1st ed. 
1994). 
 174. Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972) (“We, of course, agree that the 
courts of appeals should have wide latitude in their decisions of whether or how to write 
opinions. That is especially true with respect to summary affirmances.”). 
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Moving now to the empirical results, Figure 4, infra, shows the annual 
percentage of claim construction appeals that garnered a written opinion.  
Figure 4: Percentage of Claim Construction Appeals with a Written Opinion 
Markman Cybor
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The ordinate illustrates the percentage of decisions that received a written 
opinion plotted against the year of the Federal Circuit disposition. All of the 
opinions in a given year are collapsed into a single data point.175 For clarity, 
Figure 4 notes the dates of the Markman I and Cybor decisions.  
Almost simultaneously with Markman I in 1995, the Federal Circuit 
decreased the rate of summary affirmances and began issuing more written 
opinions on claim construction. To provide a more comprehensive analysis, a 
multiple-regression model of the data was developed. According to the 
model, even when other potentially explanatory variables are controlled for, 
the odds of a written opinion after Markman I are more than twice as high as 
 
 175. There have been 1288 opinions over eighteen years, and there are approximately 
seventy-two opinions per year. Regression assumes that each variable is independent and 
identically distributed, but this assumption may not hold in a precedential system in which a 
prior decision influences subsequent decisions. See James Greiner, Judicial Decisions as Data 
Points, SOCIAL SCIENCE STATISTICS BLOG (March 20, 2007, 16:40 EST), http://www. 
iq.harvard.edu/blog/sss/archives/2007/03/ (arguing that certain empirical assumptions 
should be cautiously considered in a precedential system). After a court decides a significant 
precedential case which clarifies or alters the substantive doctrine, one might expect a 
subsequent decrease in written and precedential opinions. Here, the trend illustrated in 
Figures 4 and 5 shows increased precedential and written opinions after Markman, which is 
in the opposite direction of this prediction. In fact, the role of precedent may if anything be 
downwardly tampering the effects. However, the effects of precedent are very complicated, 
and an alternative hypothesis is that new case law invites uncertainty and more precedential 
written opinions. Further research is needed into the general question of the relationship 
between legal precedent and the assumptions in empirical models.  
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before Markman I, and the difference is statistically significant. 176  As 
illustrated in Figure 4, the Federal Circuit resolved only about sixty percent of 
all claim construction appeals from 1991 until 1995 with a written opinion. 
Thus, it was quite likely that a claim construction appeal resulted in no case 
law (either precedential or non-precedential), and no guidance to litigants.177 
After 1995 (the year Markman I was decided), however, the rate of written 
opinions quickly increased to between eighty and eighty-five percent.178  
It should be noted that there is a downward spike in Figure 4 that begins 
in September 2006 and ends in very early 2007. The reason for that spike 
presently cannot be completely explained. The time period of the spike 
begins in September, which is roughly contemporaneous with the turnover 
of law clerks. Perhaps for that year only, some judges amassed a backlog of 
cases with their old clerks and used summary affirmances to pare their 
dockets. An alternative explanation relates to district court decisions appealed 
shortly before the en banc Phillips v. AWH decision but decided by the 
Federal Circuit around the time of the spike.179 Perhaps these were appeals in 
which the district court correctly construed the claims but used the wrong 
rationale, such as placing a heavy reliance on dictionaries. The Federal Circuit 
judges may have agreed that the result was correct and utilized summary 
 
 176. The detailed regression results can be found in Tables 4a and 4b in the Appendix. 
The control variables for the main regression of Tables 4a are the geographic location of the 
district court (i.e., which Circuit the district court resided in); whether the district court was 
in one of the ten busiest patent districts during the given year; the technology of the 
underlying patent (chemical, mechanical, or electrical), the posture of the district court 
judgment (preliminary injunction, summary judgment, jury trial, or bench trial), and winner 
at the district court (patentee or accused infringer). The odds ratio is 2.86 with a p-value of 
0.000. A p-value of 0.05 or less signifies that the null hypothesis—in this case that there is no 
difference in the use of summary affirmance/Rule 36 before and after Markman—can be 
rejected with a 95% confidence level. Here, the p-value is 0.000, which means that the null-
hypothesis can be rejected. The odds ratio means it was 186% more likely at the mean for a 
summary affirmance/Rule 36 claim construction decision before Markman I, after 
controlling for the aforementioned variables. A separate regression shown in Table 4b 
includes the total number of patent opinions and Rule 36 cases on any issue, not just claim 
construction. The results of the separate regression show that even controlling for Federal 
Circuit patent opinions and Rule 36 decisions outside of claim construction, it was 96% 
more likely at the mean for a Rule 36 claim construction decision before Markman I than 
after (p-value=0.000). For a discussion of regression analysis, see supra note 175. 
 177. The author takes no position on the optimal or minimum amount of case law to 
develop a doctrine. Rather, it is only noted that after Markman I, the court employed Rule 36 
less frequently than before. 
 178. It is also worth noting that there were no substantial increases in the number of 
active Federal Circuit judges during this time period. 
 179. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (resolving an 
intra-circuit split on whether dictionary definitions should be the default claim construction 
of a disputed term). 
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affirmances in these instances. Finally, it is possible that it is an unintentional 
clustering of results in the data.180 In any event, this data was included within 
the regression and the results remain statistically significant. 
After Markman, the Federal Circuit vastly increased the number of 
written opinions describing claim construction methodology and analysis.181 
Not only did it receive more appeals involving claim construction after 
Markman,182 but it drafted written opinions for a greater percentage of those 
appeals.183 The larger volume of opinions signals to litigants the increased 
importance of the doctrine. When more cases address a particular issue, 
litigants understand that the court is interested in the issue. Because summary 
affirmances do not include any written opinions, the public (other than the 
particular litigants involved in the case) cannot easily know what issues were 
raised in those cases. The focus on claim construction in opinions 
encouraged litigants to raise this issue on appeal. This further increased the 
significance of the doctrine of claim construction.  
2. Reallocation Hypothesis #2: After Markman I, the Federal Circuit issued 
a greater percentage of  precedential opinions  
The second hypothesis is that the Federal Circuit issued a greater 
percentage of precedential opinions on claim construction after Markman. In 
addition to resolving cases without any opinion (by summary affirmance), the 
courts can also issue different types of written opinions. For every written 
opinion, the courts of appeals may designate the opinion as either 
precedential or non-precedential. 184  Precedential opinions have various 
functions—announcing new law, applying settled law to new facts, and 
 
 180. A Federal Circuit judge on the bench during this time period told the author that 
he believes it is random. 
 181. Some may argue that a court issues a written opinion instead of a summary 
affirmance when the dispute is complicated. However, there is no reason to believe that the 
complexity of disputes changed in 1995. So this does not explain the change in the frequency 
of written opinions in claim construction beginning in 1995. 
 182. There are several potential reasons that parties brought more appeals involving 
claim construction issues. One reason, which is consistent with doctrinal reallocation, is that 
the parties recognized the court’s elevation of the doctrine in importance. If parties know 
the court believes an issue is important, it is not surprising that it is frequently raised.  
 183. It is possible that the increase in Rule 36 is mere happenstance, or alternatively, due 
to an increase in the quality of the briefs submitted by the parties. However, because the 
timing of the increase so closely corresponds to Markman, these other explanations appear 
unlikely. 
 184. See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More 
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 234–35 (2005).  
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recording important discussion or criticisms of settled rules.185  The court 
spends more time drafting a precedential opinion because it binds future 
appellate panels as precedent.186 Non-precedential opinions, also known as 
unpublished opinions, are citable by litigants but do not serve as precedent in 
the district or appellate court.187 The main rationale for unpublished opinions 
is that they conserve judicial resources.188 They are typically shorter with less 
discussion of the facts. All federal courts of appeal utilize non-precedential 
opinions to some extent. 189  Courts can choose which opinions to make 
precedential or non-precedential. 
Increasing the proportion of precedential opinions may increase the 
importance of the doctrine. Precedential opinions signal that the appellate 
court considers the doctrine significant. To increase the importance of claim 
construction, the Federal Circuit increased the percentage of precedential 
written opinions after Markman. 
There are other possible reasons a court may increase the number of 
written opinions or the designation of precedential opinions. For example, it 
could be that a new, fledgling doctrine needs to be fleshed out more in case 
law. It is doubtful that this rationale applies to claim construction, even 
though a new actor—the judge—was given responsibility for the task. The 
Federal Circuit articulated the canons of claim construction in numerous 
 
 185. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807, 808; see also William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, 
Appellate Justice Bureaucracy and Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 623, 632–33 (1988); 
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-precedential Precedent—Limited Publication 
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1182–83 
(1978). 
 186. See Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU 
L. REV. 3, 50. 
 187. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 was amended in 2007 to require all circuit courts to permit 
citation of unpublished opinions. Before 2007, some circuits permitted citation of 
unpublished opinions without limitation and some discouraged their citation. For a good list 
of the differences among circuits pre-2007, see Robert T. Reagan, Citing Unpublished Federal 
Appellate Decisions Issued Before 2007, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (Mar. 9, 2007), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Unpub_Opinions.pdf.  
 188. See, e.g., William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the 
Titanic, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1290, 1293 (1996) (stating that increased judicial caseload 
required limited publication of cases). 
 189. Penelope Pether, Constitutional Solipsism: Toward a Thick Doctrine of Article III Duty; or 
Why the Federal Circuits’ Nonprecedential Status Rules Are (Profoundly) Unconstitutional, 17 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 955, 960 (2009) (“[T]he percentage of federal appellate decisions that are 
unpublished presently runs at almost eighty-five percent . . . .”). 
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cases before Markman.190 Furthermore, if the doctrine merely needed to be 
fleshed out, the increase in precedential opinions should be temporary, 
ending when the doctrine was sufficiently developed. Consequently, more 
precedential opinions over a long period of time may signal the increased 
salience of the doctrine.  
Turning now to the empirical data, Figure 5, infra, shows the percentage 
of claim construction appeals resolved by a precedential opinion from 1991 
until 2008.  
Figure 5: Percentage of Claim Construction Appeals  
Resolved with a Precedential Opinion 
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After controlling for potentially explanatory variables in a multiple 
regression model, the results are statistically significant; it was more than 
twice as likely for the Federal Circuit to issue a precedential opinion after 
Markman I than before. 191  Beginning in 1996, there was a spike in the 
percentage of claim construction appeals that were resolved via precedential 
 
 190. See generally 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[2][a] (rev. 2007) 
(identifying twelve examples of canons of claim construction and providing citations of case 
authority for the canons dating back until the 1930s). 
 191. The regression details can be found in Table 5a in the Appendix. The control 
variables are the geographic location of the district court (i.e., which Circuit the district court 
resided in); whether the district court was in one of the ten busiest patent districts during the 
given year; the technology of the underlying patent (chemical, mechanical, or electrical), the 
procedural posture of the district court judgment (preliminary injunction, summary 
judgment, jury trial, or bench trial), and winner at the district court (patentee or accused 
infringer). The odds ratio is 2.35 with a p-value of 0.000, meaning that it is 135% more likely 
at the mean. The second regression controlling for overall Federal Circuit patent docket 
could not be performed. It was not feasible to gather data on precedential opinions on all 
areas of law. 
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opinions. Non-precedential opinions and summary affirmances are two 
different methods of deciding cases without a precedential opinion. 
In doctrines such as claim construction that are based upon guidelines 
rather than rules, precedent is especially important in teaching how to 
properly decide cases.192 Precedent binds future court panels. In theory, as 
the volume of precedents increases, courts should be more likely to find a 
prior opinion that matches or nearly matches the facts at hand.193 After the 
1996 spike, the level of precedential opinions remained elevated compared to 
the pre-Markman levels. More specifically, in the years before Markman 
(1991–1994), the Federal Circuit decided 30.5% of claim construction 
appeals with precedential opinions. But, in the years afterwards (1997–2003), 
the Federal Circuit decided 46.5% with precedential opinions. Some may 
argue that increased precedential opinions were necessary to develop the 
claim construction doctrine after Markman clarified that it was a matter of 
law. However, the Federal Circuit articulated the various canons of claim 
construction in numerous cases before 1995.194 Furthermore, this would not 
explain why there is still, fifteen years after Markman I, an elevated level of 
precedential opinions. Today, the Federal Circuit has explained each of the 
canons in numerous post-Markman opinions. 
Thus, the Federal Circuit increased the number of written and 
precedential claim construction opinions after Markman. Since the Federal 
Circuit arguably desired litigants and district court judges to focus on claim 
construction, it appears to be a reasonable and prudent decision to increase 
the body of case law analyzing that issue. Now, almost fifteen years after 
Markman, there are a plethora of precedential claim construction opinions. 
3. Reallocation Hypothesis #3: After Cybor, a greater proportion of  appeals 
were from grants of  summary judgment  
The third hypothesis asserts that a greater proportion of appeals that 
reach the Federal Circuit were from grants of motions for summary 
 
 192. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 577–
78 (1992) (discussing the role of precedent when standards are utilized). 
 193. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 
2622–23 (1995) (arguing that the rules and precedents resulting from litigation have 
“obvious importance for guiding future behavior and imposing order and certainty”). 
 194. See generally 5A CHISUM, supra note 190, § 18.03[2][a] (identifying twelve examples of 
canons of claim construction and providing citations of case authority for the canons dating 
back until the 1930s). To be fair, there were some short-lived intra-circuit disputes about 
how to perform claim construction. Holbrook, supra note 27, at 146–48 (noting the court’s 
struggle between the Vitronics and Texas Digital methodologies). However, the level of 
precedential opinions has been relatively constant, not tied to particular disagreements. 
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judgment. As the claim construction doctrine became more important, it was 
dispositive in more cases. District court judges could more easily grant 
summary judgment because of the horizontal reallocation. In patent cases, 
there is often less dispute over the structure of the accused product than 
there is concerning the construction of the patent. Because claim 
construction is a matter of law, it is resolved without using the summary 
judgment standard, namely, all inferences to the non-moving party. Once the 
primary battle on claim construction is resolved, the remaining issues on 
literal infringement are more straightforward.195 The vertical reallocation also 
encouraged resolution by summary judgment. Because the district court 
judges understood that their decisions would be reviewed on appeal using a 
de novo standard, they desired to resolve the cases quicker. Finally, as the 
doctrine became more important and more central to patent law, district 
courts could entirely dispose of more cases after construing the claims.  
The data reflects that the percentage of claim construction appeals 
decided by summary judgment increased over time. Figure 6, infra, shows the 
percentage of claim construction appeals that arose from district court 
summary judgment orders. 
Figure 6: Percentage of Claim Construction Appeals from Summary Judgment 
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As claim construction became more important, a greater percentage of 
appeals reviewed summary judgment decisions as opposed to the results of 
bench trials, jury trials, or rulings on preliminary injunctions. This data is 
 
 195. Literal infringement and claim construction may be seen as doctrinally linked after 
Markman I. 
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consistent with data from other researchers arguing that Markman 
encouraged summary judgment in patent cases.196 
The multiple regression model indicates that it was over one hundred 
percent more likely for the appeal to be from a grant of summary judgment 
after Cybor than before.197 As can be seen from Figure 6, less than forty 
percent of claim construction appeals were from summary judgment during 
the period from 1991 until 1993. The first increase in appeals from summary 
judgment occurred before Markman I in 1994. Looking at this data alone, it 
does not appear that Markman I by itself immediately caused the increase in 
summary judgments. Instead, a temporary increase appears just before 
Markman I, and a sustained increase appears around 1998, the time of the 
Cybor decision.  
However, there is a natural time lag in the litigation process. The appeal 
process itself takes approximately one year, and the trial court proceedings 
longer than that.198 Considering this delay, the possibility that the increase in 
appeals from summary judgment is due to Markman cannot be excluded. 
After 1998, the percentage of claim construction appeals from summary 
judgment sharply increased to almost seventy percent. It thereafter remained 
substantially constant. In the last ten years, approximately seventy percent of 
appeals of claim constructions arose in the summary judgment context. 
Others reported similar increases in summary judgment in patent litigation, 
even beyond claim construction. For example, Petherbridge, in his findings, 
noted a trend toward an increased percentage of appeals from a finding of 
summary judgment of non-infringement.199 Data on whether district courts 
issued fewer summary judgments in earlier years are not readily available. 
 
 196. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958 (noting that Markman drives summary 
judgments); Burk & Lemley, supra note 26, at 1795 (asserting that Markman increased 
summary judgment); Lee & Krug, supra note 131, at 59 (observing that the Markman 
decisions could encourage summary proceedings); Petherbridge, Claim Construction Effect, 
supra note 2, at 243. 
 197. The results of the regression can be found in Table 6a in the Appendix. The 
control variables are the same as those for precedential opinions described supra note 191. 
The odds ratio for this regression is 3.38 with a p-value of 0.000. 
 198. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 282–
83 (2005) (noting that the average trial court patent case, including and weighted down by 
those which settled early, pended well over a year). 
 199. Petherbridge, Doctrine of Equivalents, supra note 2, at 1394; see also Mary A. 
Woodford, Presentation to Ropes & Gray LLP: Preliminary Analysis of IPLC Data: Patent 
Infringement Cases 13 (June 2009) (on file with author) (reporting fifty-six percent of patent 
cases filed between 2000 and 2008 and which reached judgment were decided by summary 
judgment).  
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The rise in summary judgment since Markman is not surprising. First, as 
Allison and Lemley argued, once the district court judges spent time 
evaluating patent claims, it was only natural for them to attempt to resolve 
the case. In fact, many judges only construed the claims in the context of 
dispositive motions. Further, summary judgment may be appropriate in a 
large number of these cases. Once the judges construed the claims, there will 
not be a genuine issue of material fact in cases where the parties do not 
dispute the structure or function of the accused device or method. Second, as 
discussed in Section II.B.2, the doctrinal displacement of the doctrine of 
equivalents followed the reallocation in claim construction. The doctrine of 
equivalents was historically a quintessential jury issue. By reducing the 
importance of this doctrine, judges could grant more summary judgment 
motions. Third, the increased importance of claim construction and the 
reduced importance of the doctrine of equivalents may motivate both courts 
and litigants to resolve cases via summary judgment. The Federal Circuit’s 
high claim construction reversal rate is well known.200 The Federal Circuit 
also does not review claim constructions through an interlocutory appeal.201 
Summary judgment permits quick review by the Federal Circuit, a goal often 
shared by both litigants and the district court.202  
The doctrinal reallocation in patent law had other effects. Overall, the 
reallocation focused resources—of the Federal Circuit, of district courts, and 
of litigants—more on a single issue in the case. Many believe that claim 
construction ought to be central to patent litigation. By focusing resources 
on this one issue, the end product is better-organized Federal Circuit 
opinions. Before and immediately after Markman, the Federal Circuit issued 
often-confusing claim construction opinions.203 The Federal Circuit would 
blend claim construction and infringement discussions. Now the Federal 
Circuit’s claim construction opinions are better written and more 
 
 200. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(Michel, C.J., dissenting) (noting the problem in claim construction of “a steadily high 
reversal rate”). 
 201. See, e.g., V. Ajay Singh, Interlocutory Appeals in Patent Cases Under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(c)(2): Are They Still Justified and Are They Implemented Correctly?, 55 DUKE L.J. 179, 196 
(2005) (“The Federal Circuit has thus far refused to hear permissive appeals related to claim 
construction.”). 
 202. Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of 
the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 681 (2004). 
 203. An old, illustrative case is Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 959 F.2d 948 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). In Morton, the opinion has an unlabeled background section. It follows with 
a discussion containing a section labeled I, but no other subsections. Section I blends claim 
construction and literal infringement and also addresses attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 285. 
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organized.204 The clearer organization after Markman aids the reader, whether 
it is district court judges or potential litigants, in following the courts’ 
reasoning.  
B. DOCTRINAL DISPLACEMENT HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS 
This Section examines hypotheses and data that suggest that the doctrine 
of equivalents has been displaced by claim construction. Turning back to the 
theory, doctrinal displacement suggests that claim construction should have 
displaced another doctrine. The Federal Circuit horizontally reallocated the 
doctrine of claim construction to the judge, vertically reallocated the standard 
of review to de novo, and raised the profile and importance of the claim 
construction doctrine. Raising the importance of claim construction meant 
that more litigants would elect to focus on it. This caused a displacement of 
other doctrines in patent law. The first hypothesis is that as claim 
construction became more important, the doctrine of equivalents became 
less important. 
1. Displacement Hypothesis #1: After Markman I, the frequency with which 
the Federal Circuit analyzed the doctrine of  equivalents decreased and claim 
construction increased 
According to displacement theory, 205  three influences—litigation 
constraints, judicial constraints, and the gatekeeping nature of claim 
construction—together caused a displacement of the doctrine of equivalents. 
Courts used claim construction to resolve all claim scope issues. District 
court judges began to rely more on summary judgment of non-infringement. 
Litigants subsequently must have learned that the doctrine of equivalents was 
unlikely to prevail; consequently, arguments relating to the doctrine of 
equivalents were dropped or downplayed in many briefs. Because claim 
construction consumed more words, less space was left for other issues.206 
This hypothesis will be evaluated by analyzing the issues addressed in Federal 
Circuit written opinions in patent infringement appeals over selected years. 
 
 204. An exemplary recent case is Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). There, the opinion consists of three parts: (1) a background description of 
the technology and proceedings in the district court; (2) a detailed discussion of the claim 
construction dispute and resolution; and (3) a brief conclusion that a grant of summary 
judgment must be vacated because of an erroneous claim construction. Id. 
 205. See supra Section II.B. 
 206. While traditionally a jury issue, the doctrine of equivalents can be resolved on 
summary judgment if one of the legal limitations to the doctrine of equivalents applies, or if 
there is no disputed issue of material fact. Consequently, when evaluating appeals of 
judgments for non-infringement, the Federal Circuit must consider the doctrine of 
equivalents, if raised by the patentee.  
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After Markman, the frequency with which the Federal Circuit discussed the 
doctrine of equivalents should have dropped because litigants did not press it 
on appeal.  
Previous scholars have noted the decline of the doctrine of equivalents; 
yet, there is debate on the cause and timing of its demise. As noted supra, 
Allison and Lemley argue that Markman itself ended the doctrine of 
equivalents. 207  They assert that after a judge construes the claims and 
concludes that the accused product is not within the literal scope of the 
claims, the judge likely desires to resolve the case on summary judgment. To 
completely resolve the case requires that the judge also conclude that the 
product is not equivalent. Petherbridge argues that Festo appeared to be a 
tipping point for the doctrine of equivalents, showing that after Festo, a 
patentee’s success rate on appeal on the doctrine of equivalents significantly 
dropped. Thus, Allison and Lemley disagree with Petherbridge as to the 
triggering event of the decline of the doctrine of equivalents. 
The present Article cannot conclusively resolve the debate. Both scholars 
may be partially correct. However, along with a new theoretical framework to 
understand the decline of the doctrine of equivalents, it presents some 
additional evidence on this question. The new data supports the view that at 
least part of the decline occurred immediately after the increased importance 
of claim construction. The doctrine of equivalents may have continued its 
decline after Festo. As discussed in Section IV.A, supra, the doctrinal 
reallocation of claim construction resulted in claim construction becoming 
more important in patent litigation. Shifting the importance of a single 
doctrine has larger implications in real-world litigation, and the claim 
construction shift preceded a decline in the significance of the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
The doctrine of equivalents appears to have been in a more prominent 
position before Markman. When reading the opinions issued from 1991 until 
1995, the author found that the Federal Circuit addressed the doctrine of 
equivalents more frequently during that time period than the present time. In 
particular, the Federal Circuit often discussed the doctrine of equivalents in 
robust detail, much the way the Federal Circuit discusses claim construction 
today. Sometimes the Federal Circuit discussed the doctrine of equivalents in 
the same breath as claim construction. Additionally, claim construction was 
less important in patent litigation pre-Markman. Unlike patent litigation 
today, patentees then did not focus on the claim language to prove their 
charges of infringement. Instead, they presented arguments to the jury about 
 
 207. Supra Part I. 
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the “invention” and attempted to divorce the “invention” from the specific 
claim language.  
Figure 7, infra, displays the prevalence of claim construction and the 
doctrine of equivalents before the Federal Circuit in 1991, 1994, 1997, and 
2000.208 
Figure 7: Percentage of Federal Circuit Written Opinions Analyzing the  
Doctrine of Equivalents and Claim Construction 
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The most striking aspect of Figure 7 is the increase in claim construction 
at the Federal Circuit. Before Markman, claim construction appeared in less 
than fifty percent of appellate decisions, as shown in the left two bars. After 
Markman, it substantially increased, reaching seventy percent of decisions by 
2000.209 During the same time period, the doctrine of equivalents declined, 
albeit less dramatically. While the results surrounding the doctrine of 
equivalents are not statistically significant, the general trend is not in the 
wrong direction. These results reflect a limited sample of cases. 
One reason why a larger drop in the doctrine of equivalents is not 
evident relates to the increase in appeals from grants of summary judgment 
of non-infringement. In order to grant summary judgment of non-
infringement, the district court must determine that there is no issue of 
 
 208. The percentage is based upon the number of opinions raising the issue/doctrine 
relative to the total number of merits opinions for the year. 
 209. Claim construction is a gatekeeper doctrine that may be present in invalidity and 
infringement discussions, while the doctrine of equivalents may be present only in 
infringement discussions. However, claim construction always had this status as a 
gatekeeper; Markman did not start it. Consequently, the gatekeeper status cannot explain the 
difference between the rates before and after Markman. 
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material fact to either literal infringement or the doctrine of equivalents. To 
affirm, the Federal Circuit should mention, at least briefly, both bases of the 
district court’s ruling. There was a large jump in appeals from orders granting 
summary judgment of non-infringement from 1991 until 2000. Considering 
all merits appeals in the appellate issue database, appeals from summary 
judgments of non-infringement comprised 13.0% of 1991 opinions, 20.0% 
of 1994 opinions, 28.9% of 1997 opinions, and 46.9% of 2000 opinions. 
Consequently, changes in summary judgment practice in patent litigation, 
perhaps driven by Cybor, may have played a role in inflating the number of 
doctrine of equivalents arguments raised in later years. This is consistent with 
the judicial constraints explanation for displacement.  
The coding mechanism used in the appellate issue database may also 
partially explain why the drop in the doctrine of equivalents appears modest. 
Each issue raised in the appellate decision was weighted equivalently. For 
example, if the Federal Circuit discussed doctrine of equivalents for a 
paragraph and claim construction for five pages, the database coded each 
doctrine the same. 
2. Displacement Hypothesis #2: After Markman I, the Federal Circuit 
discussed the doctrine of  equivalents in fewer words, and claim construction 
with more words 
The second displacement hypothesis was tested using the word count 
appellate database. Word count data permits analysis of displacement in 
greater detail and overcomes the aforementioned limitation of the appellate 
issue database. Even when the Federal Circuit analyzed the doctrine of 
equivalents by the Federal Circuit after Markman, it should occupy less space 
in the opinions. Decreased word count can support the hypothesis, assuming 
that word count is a proxy for importance or at least a proxy for how much 
analysis the court deemed sufficient for explanation and resolution of an 
issue.210  
 
 210. Other studies have used word count as a rough proxy for importance. See, e.g., 
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 549, 587 (2008) (analyzing word count data because “in explaining (or defending) their 
analysis of a legal issue, judges are generally more likely to dedicate a greater share of their 
explanations to considerations that they deem to be more important”); Jennifer L. Groscup 
et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal 
Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339 (2002); Hall & Wright, supra note 147, at 117 (“For 
instance, some studies count the number of words or paragraphs devoted to discussing 
particular factors as an indication of the factors’ relative importance.”); Carl W. Roberts, A 
Conceptual Framework for Qualitative Text Analysis, 34 QUALITY & QUANTITY 259, 263 (2000) 
(“Analyses of word-counts yield inferences about the predominance of themes in texts.”); 
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Figure 8, infra, shows the word count of summary judgment opinions 
involving claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents over time. As 
described in more detail in Section III.A.3, supra, the percentages were 
calculated by dividing the number of words in the opinion addressing claim 
construction or the doctrine of equivalents by the number of words in the 
“Discussion” section of the opinion addressing all issues on appeal.211 
Figure 8: Percentage of Words Devoted to  
Claim Construction and Doctrine of Equivalents 
 
The vertical lines at 1995 and 2000 in Figure 8 represent Markman I and 
Festo. It is important to remember that the word count appellate database 
only includes resolutions from summary judgment so juries did not evaluate 
either issue in the district court in any of the observations. 
Figure 8 shows that the doctrine of equivalents occupied about a third of 
the discussion of Federal Circuit opinions before Markman I while claim 
construction entailed about a quarter of the opinions. During this time 
period, the doctrine of equivalents averaged a slightly greater percentage of 
the words than claim construction. After Markman I, the percentage of words 
devoted to the doctrine of equivalents dropped off, and varied from 
 
Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Development of a Legal Rule: The Federal Common Law of Public Nuisance, 32 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 613 (1998).  
 211. The yearly percentage was calculated by averaging the percentages for each decision 
within the year. If the yearly percentage was calculated by averaging the total number of 
relevant words in the opinions, then a few long opinions in a given year would skew the 
results. In other words, an opinion with a large word count would have a disproportionate 
influence on the overall results.  
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approximately twelve percent to approximately twenty-five percent. In 
contrast, during the same time period, claim construction increased in terms 
of the percentage of words in an opinion. From 1996 until 2000, claim 
construction comprised between forty and fifty-five percent of the opinions 
each year. Before Markman I, it encompassed between twenty and thirty 
percent of opinions. These results are statistically significant.212  
To keep this result in the proper context, the total word count in the 
discussion section of opinions varied slightly over time. It increased 
approximately ten percent from the pre-Markman I period until Festo, and 
approximately another ten percent from Festo until the end of 2004.213 So 
while the opinions increased in size, the increase was not substantial and 
most likely does not account for the change in word count of claim 
construction and the doctrine of equivalents around these events. And more 
importantly, the word count devoted to the doctrine of equivalents decreased 
while the count for claim construction increased. 
This data supports the view that doctrinal displacement occurred after 
doctrinal reallocation and the doctrine of equivalents became less significant 
after Markman. 214  The drop in Figure 8 after Markman is significant. The 
trend continued after Festo, with the doctrine of equivalents becoming more 
marginalized, and claim construction more important.  
However, patent litigation is complex and word count information 
cannot fully capture the significance of the doctrines. There may be multiple 
confounding factors a word count analysis cannot decode. For example, the 
data does not control for changes in complexity and difficulty in analyzing 
claim construction or the doctrine of equivalents, if any, over time. 
Nonetheless, the data is consistent with Allison and Lemley’s narrative that 
 
 212. The results of a t-test suggest a statistically significant difference between the 
proportion of the word count devoted to claim construction before and after the Markman 
opinion had been issued (t=-3.9403, p=0.0001). The results of a t-test also suggest a 
statistically significant difference between the proportion of the word count devoted to the 
doctrine of equivalents before and after the Markman opinion (t=2.9810, p=0.0033). Because 
the distribution of the proportions of doctrine of equivalents word counts was not normal 
(in contrast to the proportions for claim construction, which were), two alternative statistical 
tests were performed. Both of these tests, a Wilcox-Mann-Whitney test (z=2.679, p=0.0074) 
and a general linear model (z=-2.89, p=0.004), provide the same result. 
 213. The average discussion section before Markman I was 3154 words, between 
Markman I and Festo, it was 3483 words, and after Festo until the end of 2004 it was 3876 
words. That works out to a 10.4% increase after Markman I and an 11.3% increase after 
Festo. 
 214. Scholars have used word court as a proxy for measuring the importance of an issue 
in legal opinions. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 210. 
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the doctrine of equivalents became less important as claim construction 
became more so. 
Some may assert that when a doctrine becomes more important, it is 
natural for a court to temporarily increase the word count devoted to that 
doctrine.215 The court in these circumstances needs to explain the enhanced 
doctrine to litigants and lower courts. This account does not completely 
explain the results of the present study. Figure 8 shows that the increase in 
word count for claim construction was not an aberration lasting only a few 
years. In fact, over time, claim construction occupied more and more 
decision space.216 Similarly, some may argue that the increasing complexity of 
technologies and patents may explain the results.217 However, the increasing 
complexity should affect both claim construction and the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
This data, while only one way of analyzing the events, supports the view 
that the doctrine of equivalents dropped in importance as claim construction 
increased. The same trend can be analyzed by scrutinizing the opinions 
themselves. For example, in the illustrative 1994 case Wolverine World Wide, 
Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 218  the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment of non-infringement.219 The court first considered the 
district court’s claim construction of the term “forefoot-enveloping.”220 The 
court affirmed the claim construction with a three-paragraph discussion over 
the space of a page and a half.221 The court then disposed of the patentee’s 
literal infringement appeal in two paragraphs.222 Finally, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the patentee’s doctrine of equivalents appeal. 223  The doctrine of 
equivalents analysis, although only two paragraphs in length, was more 
thorough than the court’s analysis on other issues. The detailed analysis 
examined two portions of the specification of the patent-in-suit and 
 
 215. The same can be said if the doctrine merely changes or becomes uncertain. 
 216. Furthermore, the variance in average word counts of the “Discussion” sections 
over time does not appear to cause the results. There is some variance in the yearly word 
count averages. The average word count of the “Discussion” sections of the opinions over 
this ten-year period was approximately 3300 words. The average for eight of the ten years 
fell within a relatively narrow band of the overall average, within twenty percent of 3300. 
The data for two years fell outside this band, 1994 being lower and 1998 being higher.  
 217. Allison & Lemley, supra note 24, at 79 (noting increased complexity in patents from 
the 1970s when compared to those from the 1990s). 
 218. 38 F.3d 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
 219. Id. at 1194.   
 220. Id. at 1196–98.  
 221. Id.  
 222. Id. at 1198–99.  
 223. Id. at 1199–2000.  
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compared how the patented invention operated with the accused products.224 
After that analysis, the court affirmed the district court’s holding.225  
In more recent cases, the doctrine of equivalents plays a lesser role, 
especially when compared to claim construction. For example, in Welker 
Bearing v. PHD, the Federal Circuit reviewed an opinion granting summary 
judgment of non-infringement. 226  After setting forth details about the 
patented technology and the district court proceedings, the opinion devoted 
nearly five pages to the issue of claim construction.227 The term in dispute 
was “mechanism for moving said finger.”228 The court devoted nearly two 
pages discussing whether the claim was in means-plus-function format, 
eventually concluding that the claim included language in means-plus-
function format.229  
Thereafter, the Welker Bearing opinion delves into the details of the claim 
construction for three solid pages of analysis. 230  The Federal Circuit 
considered the patent specification, explicitly reciting and analyzing 
information provided in six locations in the patent specification. 231  It 
discussed the claim construction doctrines: claim differentiation, ordinary 
meaning and clear disavowal of claim scope.232 Finally, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s claim construction.233 As for literal infringement, 
the opinion contains two paragraphs disposing of the issue.234 In those two 
paragraphs, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion of no 
literal infringement.235  
Finally, the Federal Circuit reached the doctrine of equivalents. 236  In 
affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment, the Federal Circuit 
opinion included only two paragraphs relating to the doctrine of 
equivalents. 237  As described above, the Federal Circuit’s current opinions 
focus much less on the doctrine of equivalents than pre-Markman opinions. 
The lack of Federal Circuit focus supports the declining importance of the 
 
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. at 2000. 
 226. Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
 227. Id. at 1095–99.  
 228. Id. at 1095.  
 229. Id. at 1095–97.  
 230. Id. at 1097–99.  
 231. Id. at 1098–99.  
 232. Id. at 1099.  
 233. Id.  
 234. Id.  
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 1099–1100.  
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doctrine of equivalents. As discussed infra, this decline—whether the direct 
result of the increased prominence of the claim construction doctrine, 
substantive changes to the law of the doctrine of equivalents, or some 
combination of the two—is consistent with doctrinal reallocation.  
This decline of the doctrine of equivalents is partially attributable to the 
case law’s development of limitations on the doctrine of equivalents. The 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit decided several doctrine of 
equivalents cases.238 These legal limits provided substantive changes in the 
doctrine. A substantive change can directly increase or decrease the 
importance of the doctrine. If a decrease in significance occurs, litigants may 
raise the doctrine less frequently.  
Alternatively, these case law developments may be thought of as another 
doctrinal reallocation—moving part of the decision-making on the doctrine 
of equivalents from the jury to the judge. Shifting to judicial decision-making 
provides the court control to decide the importance of a doctrine. In contrast 
to claim construction, the Federal Circuit used its control to diminish the 
doctrine of equivalents. Petherbridge showed that the Federal Circuit 
reversed district court holdings of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents and affirmed district court rejections of such infringement.239 In 
other words, the Federal Circuit used its institutional power to weaken the 
doctrine of equivalents after its doctrinal reallocation. 
The conclusions reached by this study are consistent with the 
conclusions of Allison, Lemley, and Petherbridge. Federal Circuit opinions 
reduced emphasis on the doctrine of equivalents after Markman.240 Patentees 
have little success on the doctrine of equivalents after Markman. 241  The 
doctrine of equivalents has lost power as claim construction increased in 
prominence and importance within patent law.242 However, further study is 
needed on the exact timing of the decline of the doctrine of equivalents. It is 
still unclear how much of the decline followed Warner-Jenkinson and Festo, and 
how much already occurred before these decisions. 
 
 238. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Johnson & Johnston 
Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S. 
722 (2002).  
 239. Petherbridge, Doctrine of Equivalents, supra note 2, at 1386–87, 1399. 
 240. Id. at 1394; Petherbridge, Claim Construction Effect, supra note 2, at 233. 
 241. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 966–67; Petherbridge, Doctrine of Equivalents, supra 
note 2, at 1387. 
 242. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 966–67; Petherbridge, Claim Construction Effect, 
supra note 2, at 233. 
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Claim construction opinions are of limited precedential value beyond 
interpreting the particular patent at issue. But others in the marketplace, such 
as competitors, are often interested in the construction of the terms of any 
litigated patent. Thus, appellate claim construction opinions are often 
valuable beyond the immediate parties to the litigation. In contrast, opinions 
on the doctrine of equivalents are not. The doctrine of equivalents analysis 
will be specific to each individual accused product. In most cases, the 
doctrine of equivalents analysis is not applicable to third parties. 
Consequently, it makes sense to devote more resources to claim construction 
information and opinions. That information is valuable to more entities than 
information on the doctrine of equivalents.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article provides a novel theoretical model and extensive empirical 
evidence to explain the decline of the doctrine of equivalents. In recent years, 
John Allison, Mark Lemley, and Lee Petherbridge studied the doctrine of 
equivalents. While these scholars noted and provided some evidence that the 
successful use of the doctrine of equivalents decreased, none clearly 
explained why. As such, the cause and precise mechanism behind the so-
called “demise” of the doctrine of equivalents have largely remained a 
mystery.  
This Article explains that the demise occurred because of two 
complementary forces discussed for the first time in this Article: doctrinal 
reallocation and doctrinal displacement. Under doctrinal reallocation, a 
substantive doctrine may become more important after a shift in adjudicative 
control over that doctrine. Doctrinal displacement posits that an increase in 
the importance of a doctrine may in turn decrease the importance of another, 
typically related, doctrine. This Article’s empirical results support the position 
that the demise of the doctrine of equivalents was a result of these twin 
forces. 
The study of doctrinal reallocation and doctrinal displacement in the law 
and its after effects is merely beginning. Until this study, it has never been 
formally discussed or empirically examined. The present study uses the 
theories of doctrinal reallocation and doctrinal displacement to explain the 
demise of the doctrine of equivalents. Further study is warranted to see 
whether the phenomena can explain other changes in the law, in areas within 
and beyond patent law. And it raises the further important question: is 
doctrinal displacement intentional? Does the court know ex ante that 
doctrinal reallocation likely leads to doctrinal displacement? If the court does, 
it has never expressly acknowledged it. 
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The general theories of doctrinal reallocation and displacement may allow 
hypotheses on how proposed procedural changes will affect existing 
doctrines. For example, some have argued to remove the doctrine of 
obviousness in patent law from the control of the jury.243 What would be the 
likely consequences of such a change? Which doctrine would be displaced? 
Separately, what will happen if the pending patent reform bills244 are passed 
by Congress? Displacement theory can help find the answers. 
 
 243. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Medela AG v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 624 
(2009) (No. 09-198), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 806. 
 244. Patent Reform Act, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act, H.R. 1260, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
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APPENDIX: DETAILED REGRESSION TABLES 
 
Table 4a: Regression for Hypothesis #1: Written Opinions 
(corresponding to Figure 4, page 1193) 
Variable Logistic Regression  Odds Ratio (Std. Error)245 
Case decided before Markman I 2.861*** (.589) 
District court in 2nd Circuit246 1.098 (.426) 
District court in 3rd Circuit 1.560 (.605) 
District court in 4th Circuit 1.618 (.720) 
District court in 5th Circuit 0.940 (.368) 
District court in 6th Circuit 1.468 (.582) 
District court in 7th Circuit 1.198 (.441) 
District court in 8th Circuit 1.502 (.615) 
District court in 9th Circuit 1.274 (.437) 
District court in 10th Circuit 1.300 (.612) 
District court in 11th Circuit 0.731 (.320) 
District court in one of 10 busiest patent courts 1.133 (.177) 
Chemical Patent (PTO class)247 2.704*** (.569) 
Electrical Patent (PTO class) 1.389 (.234) 
Appeal from grant of summary judgment248 1.427 (.334) 
Appeal from bench trial 1.366 (.302) 
Appeal from jury trial 0.475** (.135) 
Patentee won at district court 1.309 (.249) 
Pseudo R2 
 
# Obs 
.0569 
 
1247 
 
 
 245. *** Significant at the .001 level, ** Significant at the .01 level, * Significant at the 
.05 level, Standard errors in parentheses. 
 246. Base circuit is 1st Circuit. 
 247. Base technology is mechanical. 
 248. Base appeal is from preliminary injunction ruling. 
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Table 4b: Additional Logistic Regression for Hypothesis #1: Written Opinions 
(corresponding to Figure 4, page 1193) 
Variable Logistic Regression  Odds Ratio (Std. Error)249 
Case decided before Markman I 1.959*** (.193) 
Case involved Claim Construction 0.510*** (.043) 
Pseudo R2 
 
# Obs 
.0245 
 
4234 
Table 5a: Regression for Hypothesis #2: Precedential Opinions 
(corresponding to Figure 5, page 1197) 
Variable Logistic Regression  Odds Ratio (Std. Error)250 
Case decided before Markman I 2.345*** (.490) 
District court in 2nd Circuit251 1.595 (.541) 
District court in 3rd Circuit 1.236 (.400) 
District court in 4th Circuit 1.989 (.748) 
District court in 5th Circuit 1.209 (.417) 
District court in 6th Circuit 1.550 (.532) 
District court in 7th Circuit 1.309 (.422) 
District court in 8th Circuit 1.304 (.462) 
District court in 9th Circuit 1.282 (.385) 
District court in 10th Circuit 1.674 (.683) 
District court in 11th Circuit 1.137 (.457) 
District court in one of 10 busiest patent courts 1.089 (.148) 
Chemical Patent (PTO class)252 2.784*** (.437) 
Electrical Patent (PTO class) 1.729*** (.251) 
Appeal from grant of summary judgment253 1.582* (.308) 
Appeal from bench trial 1.358 (.243) 
Appeal from jury trial 0.473** (.136) 
Patentee won at district court 1.395* (.219) 
Pseudo R2 
 
# Obs 
.0587 
 
1247 
 
 249. *** Significant at the .001 level, ** Significant at the .01 level, * Significant at the 
.05 level, Standard errors in parentheses. 
 250. *** Significant at the .001 level, ** Significant at the .01 level, * Significant at the 
.05 level, Standard errors in parentheses. 
 251. Base circuit is 1st Circuit. 
 252. Base technology is mechanical. 
 253. Base appeal is from preliminary injunction ruling. 
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Table 6a: Regression for Hypothesis #3: Summary Judgment 
(corresponding to Figure 6, page 1199) 
Variable Logistic Regression  Odds Ratio (Std. Error)254 
Case decided before Cybor 3.383*** (.537) 
District court in 2nd Circuit255 1.136 (.428) 
District court in 3rd Circuit 1.175 (.424) 
District court in 4th Circuit 1.318 (.548) 
District court in 5th Circuit 1.387 (.535) 
District court in 6th Circuit 2.981** (1.188) 
District court in 7th Circuit 1.400 (.499) 
District court in 8th Circuit 1.472 (.587) 
District court in 9th Circuit 2.573** (.866) 
District court in 10th Circuit 1.230 (.561) 
District court in 11th Circuit 1.203 (.543) 
District court in one of 10 busiest patent courts 1.140 (.182) 
Chemical Patent (PTO class)256 0.797 (.142) 
Electrical Patent (PTO class) 1.438* (.254) 
Patentee won at district court 0.084*** (.013) 
Pseudo R2 
 
# Obs 
.2437 
 
1262 
 
 
 254. *** Significant at the .001 level, ** Significant at the .01 level, * Significant at the 
.05 level, Standard errors in parentheses. 
 255. Base circuit is 1st Circuit. 
 256. Base technology is mechanical. 
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